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CHAPTER I

CREATION OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE

That small business

1

was essential to the American

way of life was an unquestionable tenet of both liberals and
conservatives in the government prior to and during the
Second World War.

Both political factions also agreed that

the war needed to be won and that great sacrifices would be
necessary in order to achieve that victory.

Beyond these

two basic areas of agreement, however, great divergence as
to the methods to be used for conserving and protecting small
business while fighting an all-out war for survival soon
became apparent.

Nowhere was this conflict more obvious than

in the formation of the Special Committee to Study and Survey
Problems of Small Business Enterprises of the United States
Senate (hereafter referred to as the Senate Small Business
Committee) and in the hearings, debates, and legislation
Which were direct results of i t fs investigations.

^Problems of definition will be discussed in Chapter
IV.
Eventhough small business could variously be defined as
those firms employing anywhere from under 20 to 500 workers,
"small business" generally seemed as clear and separate an
entity as "farmers" or "labor," and for much the same reasons.

2
The formation of the Senate Small Business Committee
grew direqtly out of earlier studies conducted by the
Temporary National Economic Committee,

2

The TNEC had been

established by Congressional resolution approved June 16,
1938*

This resolution had been enacted in response to a

. message from President Roosevelt which said that "generally
over the field of industry and finance we must revive and
strengthen competition if we wish to preserve and make
workable our traditional system of free private enterprise."
In order to accomplish this goal, the President recommended
a more vigorous enforcement of anti-trust legislation and a
detailed study into various problems allowing for the decreased
competition in America brought about by economic concentration.
He closed his remarks in a fashion reminescent of an earlier
t ime:
No man of good faith will misinterpret these
proposals* They derive from the oldest American
traditions.
Concentration of economic power in the
few and the resulting unemployment of labor and capi
tal are inescapable problems for a modern 1private
enterprise1 democracy.
I do not believe that we
are so lacking in stability that we will lose faith
in our own way of living just because we seek to find
out how to make that way of living work more
effectively, * , .
2
,
,
Congressional Record, 76 Cong,, 3 sess., 86:11793-4,
13367-13372 «
3
U.S. Congress, 75 Cong,, 3 sess.> Temporary National
Economic Committee, Economic Prologue:
I . Hearings (Washing
ton: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 1.

Once it is realized that business monopoly in
America paralyzes the system of free enterprise on
which it is grafted, and is as fatal to those who
manipulate it as to the people who suffer beneath
its impositions, action by the Government to eliminate
these artificial restraints will be welcomed by
industry throughout the Nation,
For idle factories and idle workers profit no
m a n .4
The Temporary National Economic Committee which was
formed to study the problem of economic concentration was
composed of three members of the United States Senate,
three from the House of Representatives, one representative
each from the Departments of Justice, the Treasury, Labor,
Commerce, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Federal Trade Commission,

For its goals, the committee was

to make a complete study on monopoly and the concentration
of economic power with emphasis on the causes of concentration
and its effects on competition; the effects of existing
price systems and the price policy of industry on levels of
trade; employment, long-term profits, and consumption; and
the effects of existing tax, patent, and other government
policies on these areas.

c

On April 3* 1941* the TNEC completed its research.
In the three years of its existence^ the TNEC published
4
Ibid,, p. 191*

Ibid., p. 192,

hearings amounting to thirty-one volumes With six supplemental volumes and forty-three monographs.

6

These reports

covered almost every Conceivable area of economic Concern,
but it was the findings summarized in Monograph 17. Problems
of Small Business which directly influenced the formation of
7
the Senate Small Business Committee.
.

One of the primary allegations made in Monograph 17
was that the relative financial position Of small business
had been weakened since 1929*

8

This hypothesis was made even

more critical for the well-being of the nation when put into
the context of what were considered to be the economic
contributions of small business.

These contributions ranged

from the special services to the consumer that small busi
nesses were able to provide through ’’versatility of product
and service which, despite standardizing trends, is still
deeply desired by the American people ,” to the realization
that small businesses were important customers of large

^U.S* Congress, 76 Cong*, 3 sess*, Temporary
National Economic Committee, Description of Hearings and
Monographs (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941),
pp. 1-32.
^Congressional Record. 76 Cong., 3 sess., 86:1336713372.
8

U.S* Congress, 76 Cong*, 3 sess*, Temporary
National Economic Committee, Monograph 17i Problems of
Small Business (Washingtons Government Printing Office,
1941)* P* 267.

businesses Just as in the production of "bits and pieces,"
large industries were often dependent upon smaller concerns.
Additionally, the impetus that small businesses
/ ■ 5
*
provided the economy through competition was seen to be
fundamental:
The independent enterpriser has always been
and continues to be of immense importance in the
national psychology.
The small businessman, together
with the independent farmer and professional practi
tioner, has played an important role in fixing those
standards of personal initiative, independent economic
venturing, self-responsibility and self-determination
in business, which are basic to the American way of
life.^
In Monograph 1 7 . the TNEC made only the most general
recommendations for aid to small businesses*

These sugges

tions centered around the need for greater availability of
credit for small concerns and for more efficiency in the
management of small firms.

11

While the TNEC was completing its investigation into
the problems confronting small business, certain liberal
members of the Senate headed by James E. Murray, Democrat
of Montana, decided that a continuing study was needed if
small business problems were to be surmounted.

Murray

initially thought that small business assistance would take

9Ibid.. pp. 256-257.
10Ibid.. p. 257.
1:lIbid.. pp. 278-279.

the same form as government aid to farmers, particularly in
educating small businessmen so that they would be able to
compete more effectively with larger concerns.

12

That this

early emphasis on education would be changed to a more basic
effort to keep small business alive during a wartime economy
soon became apparent.
Small businessmen themselves were not wholeheartedly
in favor of government intervention on their behalf.

In

February, 1938, President Roosevelt had called a small busi
ness conference in an effort to win back political support
from that segment of the economy.

Confusion was the result.

Their economic position under-cut by the Depression and by
R o o s e v e l t s attempts to deal with it which most often, served
to strengthen big business at their expense, small business
men presented a disunited and unorganised front.

Astonishingly,

even in 1938, most small businessmen believed that their
interests and those of big business were synonymous.

In an

article about the small businessmens conference The Nation
stated that the Roosevelt administration faced a revolt of
small business interests.

The paradox of this situation,

the magazine stated, was that if the New Deal represented

12

U.S* Senate, 77 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Print #7:
Small Business Problems:
Research and Education (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1941)* PP* 11-12.

any one

group,

it would be the middle class small businessman.

Yet in attempting to alleviate the economic problems of the
Depression, Roosevelt had alienated those who should have
been his staunchest supporters.

The Nation suggested that

if R o osev e l t s political power was to be retained, a small
business revolt had t o .be avoided by strengthening its
position with respect to monopolies.

A re-education of small

businessmen was needed to Show them that their interests were
not with big business, but with the economic welfare of the
"common man."

"The interests of monopolies lie in maximizing

profits by restricting production and cornering the market,
but small business can only benefit from increased production
and expanded general purchasing power."

13

Senator Murray, one of the most loyal of the New
Dealers, whether at Roosevelt*s suggestion or not, undertook
this re-education.

Roosevelt*s creation of the TNEC had

already pointed to special problems confronting small bus
inesses, yet even that Committee generally agreed that more
needed to be done.

The TNEC, by its very nature, had been

organized to view the economy as a Whole.

Murray and other

New Dealers were interested in winning back the support of
small businessmen, and this the TNEC had been unable to
accomplish.

In the fall of 1940* therefore, Murray

^ The Nation. 12 February 1938, p. 173*

introduced Senate Resolution 298 which called for the
formation of a Senate Small Business

C o m m i t t e e . ^

Perhaps the strongest opposition to Senate Resolution
298 came from William H. King, a Democrat from Utah, who
ironically was one of the three Senators on the Temporary
National Economic Committee•

Indicating that the TNEC had

already Studied the problem sufficiently, he stated that the
high failure rate small businesses experienced was due to
folly, lack of understanding of the business environment, or
to lack of management capability, none of which he believed
were within the parameters of government assistance.

He

further felt that aid to small businesses would keep exces
sive numbers of these concerns in operation beyond an actual
demand for their services.

15

Senator Wallace White, a Republican from Maine, also
objected to the formation of a Senate Small Business Committee
since he believed that an unfortunate trend was developing in
which every matter of any concern was immediately elevated
to committee status.

His argument centered around the

contention that too much studying had already been done,
both by the TNEC and the Senate Committees on Banking and
14

Congressional Record. 76 Cong., 3 sess., 86:

13367.

15

Ibid.

Currency and Commerce and that their recommendations should
either be acted upon or dropped, not studied further.^
Senator Murray assured White that the new committee
would not backtrack over areas already studied by the TNEC
or other committees.

He pointed out that other special

interests had committees looking out for them as in the cases
of agriculture and labor, and he reminded the Senate that
both party platforms in 1936 had called for aid to small
businesses.

17

Murray noted that such diverse offices as

the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture
and the TNEC itself had endorsed his resolution.

He quoted

Thurman Arnold, a member of the Temporary National Economic
Committee as saying, ,falthough the files of the Department
and of the Temporary National Economic Committee should be
helpful in the work you propose, I do not feel that they
18
contain the comprehensive picture which you desire*11
Senator Barkley of Kentucky, the Senate Majority
leader, spoke in favor of the resolution, expressing the
belief that no harm could come of a further study into the
problems of small business.

He reminded the Senate that the

new committee Would have no power to report legislation and
16

.
Ibid.. p. 13369*

17Ibid.. p. 13370.
Ibid.. p. 13372.

10
would not, therefore, usurp the powers or authority of the
regular standing committees.

19

After some further amendments were introduced which
changed the committee size from five to seven members and
authorized an expenditure of $10,000 rather than the
original $15,000 for committee expenses, Murrayfs resolution
was passed by a voice vote on October 8 , 1940.

20

The items which the committee was to begin analyzing
had been outlined by Senator Murray during the debate on
Resolution 298*

These included:

(1) the necessity for

finding out the reason for the high mortality rate of
small business)

(2) the consideration of ways to provide

risk capital and loans for small business)

(3) the effect

of the large numbers of reports required by government
agencies and the need to reduce or simplify this burden)
(4 ) the seriousness of studies which showed that as a class
small business had made no profits since 1928, and (5 ) the
desireability of education and research to aid small business
similar to projects the Department of Agriculture had under
taken to help farmers.

At no time was the possibility of

war or of defense preparations and their effect on small
business mentioned.
19

21

Ibid.. p. 13371.

2lIbid.. p. 13370.

20

Ibid.

11
The following day, October 9, 1940, Senator Barkley,
the Majority leader, announced the members of the Senate
Small Business Committee*

They were:

Senators James E.

Murray, Democrat of Montana; James M* Mead, Democrat of
New York; Francis Maloney, Democrat of Connecticut; Allen
J, Ellender, Democrat of Louisiana; Tom Stewart, Democrat
of Tennessee; Robert A. Taft, Republican of Ohio; and
Arthur Capper, Republican of Kansas* 22

The Committee

remained as constituted until February 4, 1943 when Senate
Resolution 66 allowed five additional members to be appointed.
These new members were Democratic Senators Claude Pepper
of Florida and James G, Scrugham of Nevada and Republicans
George A* Wilson of Iowa; Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska;
23
and C * Douglass Buck of Delaware.
These men constituted the Senate Small Business
Committee.

They served with only minor additions and dele

tions (Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut replaced
Francis Maloney in February, 1945; Thomas C. Hart, Republican
of Connecticut, replaced Robert A. Taft in March, 1945; and
Homer E. Capehart, an Indiana Republican, replaced Hart in
December, 1945) throughout World War II.

24

In addition to

22Xbid.. p. 13415.
23
Congressional Record. 78 Cong., 1 sess., 89:566.
24Ibid.. 79 Cong., 1 sesa., 91:987, 1596, 12230.

12
the Senate members, the Small Business Committee had a staff
of economic advisers, secretaries and clerical help which
totaled between twenty and thirty people.

For a time Senator

Murray1s son, Charles A. Murray, served as the executive
secretary for the Committee but he was replaced by Charles
M. Daughters and then Dewey Anderson as the Committee became
more established*

2*5

While the initial composition of the Small Business
Committee was heavily Democratic, no open conflict was to
be expected since there was generally unanimous agreement
within Congress that small business was in need of help.
By 19439 with the addition of three Republican members,
non-partisanship became harder to sustain, especially as it
was becoming clear that small business would survive the war
in better shape than ever.

The conflict which developed

between Senator Murray, representing the liberal,New Deal
members of the Committee, and Senator Wherry, who spoke for
the conservative Republicans, had broad complications for
the entire reconversion and post-war period.

When the 1946

election shifted the majority in the Senate from the
25

U.S. Senate, 79 Cong*, 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 4 7 .
Part 1: Senate Small Business Committee - Its Record and
Outlook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945),
pp. 28*3 0 .

13
Democrats to the Republicans, a significant change in
Committee membership resulted and the Chairmanship passed
from Murray who had maintained leadership throughout the
nZ

war years, to Wherry.
This Shift in leadership within the Committee came
at a time when reconversion from the wartime economy was
almost complete and corresponded very nearly with the ending
of wage and price controls by President Truman on November
9, 1946.

Therefore, this analysis of the Senate Small

Business Committee will use for its boundaries the formation
of the Committee in October, 1940 and the end of price
controls in 1946 accompanied by the significant reorganiza
tion of the Committee which followed the 1946 election.
Oratory aside, what motivated the creation of a
special Senate committee to study the problems of small
business?

The threat of war and its effects on the economy

had not been mentioned in the debate over the formation of
the Committee, yet with the exception of the Federal Reports
Act of 1941 and the work the Senate Committee on Small Business
did in support of that legislation, very little was said
or done about small business until the end of 1941 when war
had become a reality.
26
713.

In fact, the first official

Congressional Record. 80 Cong., 1 sess., 93•644,

14
hearings of the Committee took place December 15, 16, 17,
18, and 19, 1941.27
The plight of small business was only mentioned in
the Senate twice, and then only in passing, after the
formation of the Committee for the remainder Of 1 9 4 0 . ^
In 1941 small business problems were only mentioned there
Once in a very general way, and then with defense problems
in mind, prior to the june 26, 1941 submission Of Report 479.
Part 1 . on ’’The Federal Reports Act of 194i*lf^

Again, there

was a three month gap without, any consideration of small
business problems in the Senate until September 5, 1941 when
the need for war production had caused the President to
establish by executive order the Office of Contract Distribution
as part of the Office of Production Management*

30

Perhaps the slow beginnings of the Senate Small
Business Committee can be explained in the fact that the
Temporary National Economic Committee was still in operation
and remained active until April, 1941 * While the TNEC was
27

U.S* Senate, 77 Cong*, 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems Of American Small Business, Part I .
hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942)*
28

Congressional Record index. 76 Cong*, 3 Sess.,

8 6 :547 i
^ Congressional Record* 77 Cong*, 1 sess., 8721020-1023•
30
.. .
Ibid.* p. 7381$ Congressional Record Index. 77 COhg.,
1 sess*, 87:589*

15
interested in a broader segment of the American economy,
there remained a significant area of overlapping concern
that could not be discounted regardless of the arguments
v

advanced during the debate on the formation of the Senate
committee•
The relatively slow start the Committee experienced
might perhaps be further explained in one of the comments
Senator White of Maine made in argument against the estab
lishment of the Committee when he pointed out that while
there Were many supporters of the study within government,
no one attempting to speak for small business had asked to
be studied*

As much as the New Dealers might have wanted to

develop a constituency among small businessmen, their early
efforts had been thwarted, and small business seemed
31
generally uninterested and apathetic. ‘

With the creation

of the Office of Contract Distribution, small businessmen
suddenly had something to gain of a substantial sort from
the Senate committee, and that, obviously, was a share in
the defense contract business then developing.

With a

specific goal in mind, small business representatives
suddenly became quite vocal as evidenced by their partici
pation in the first hearing conducted by the Senate Small
31
13369.

Congressional Record. 76 Cong., 3 sess., 86:

16
Business Committee.

Senator Murray summarized the situation

in his opening remarks to that hearing:
During this war effort there is a fog of fear and
apprehension spreading over the country that small
business may be wiped out. We are witnessing a
greatly accelerated expansion of monopolies and a
squeezing out of the little concern due to difficulty
in getting either defense contracts or materials for
civilian production* as well as increased difficulty
in competing under the trade practices and procedures
that have grown up under /thej big business system.
A continuation of this concentration of economic
power will be certain to result in an undermining
of the very foundations upon which our system of
free enterprise was built.
Hundreds of letters coming to our committee
from business concerns in all parts of the United
States declare their eagerness to do their share.
They maintain that* given the opportunity* small
business can play a tremendously important part
in the present all-out-war-production /sicJ program.
We believe the immediate way to help small business
is to utilize it to the greatest extent possible in
the war effort* We believe this is not only necessary
to keep small business alive* but it is of the very
essence of importance to our country at this time
when production may be the determining factor for
victory*^2
If the Senate Small Business Committee had been
inactive during its first year of existence prior to the
war* its activities after war was declared certainly
proved compensatory.

In 1942 alone* the Committee conducted

eleven hearings* published three formal reports* and
32

U.S. Senate* 77 Cong.* 1 sess.* Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part I. D e c .
15-OL9. 1941. Hearings (Washington: Government Printing
Office* 1942), pp. 2-3.

17
unofficially sponsored three major pieces of legislation.
The hearings comprised 1800 pages of testimony in which the
Committee not only heard people representing business organi
zations from all over the nation* but for which the Committee
also made several major field trips to various remote loca
tions in order to get first hand information on topics
affecting small concerns.
The year 1942 was only a beginning*

By the end of

1945* the Senate Small Business Committee had published
9484 pages of hearings* printed eight reports and five
committee prints* and had been indirectly responsible for
several legislative proposals dealing both with wartime
production and with reconversion to a peacetime economy.
While small businessmen may not have been impressed
with the Committee during most of 1941* by 1942 this attitude
had definitely changed as they saw a chance to use the
Committee to obtain access to other government agencies*
notably the Office of Production Management* the Office of
Price Administration* and the various Defense Department
procurement agencies.

Officials from all of these agencies

were regularly called to testify before the Committee to
explain their actions and that experience was sometimes
sufficient to bring about specific changes in policy as
will be demonstrated later*

Thus the existence of the

18
Seriate Small Business Committee provided a sympathetic forum
for the small businessmen of the nation during a period of
great economic stress and turmoil and sometimes resulted in
alleviating specific irritants or unfair practices.

Beyond

this sizeable accomplishment* the Committee also helped
obtain fuller utilization in war production from smaller
producers* especially through the auspices of its brainchild*
the Smaller War Plants Corporation* and it was a leader in
assessing the need for positive steps to encourage an orderly
and equitable reconversion.
While the initial motivation for the formation of
the Senate Small Business Committee might have been somewhat
nebulous* tied as it was to New Deal attempts at winning
support from a loose and uncohesive group* the coming of the
war gave the Committee direction and purpose.

If war had

been only a possibility in 1940 when the Committee was
formed* by the end of 1941 it was an actuality.

The promptness

with which the Small Business Committee called its first
hearings after the declaration of war indicates that the
Senators were aware that now there was the possibility for
direct action to aid small business* or to at least see that
it was not unduly injured* during the war years.

In the

past the TNEC and the Small Business Committee had to content
themselves with economic theories and rhetoric concerning

the plight of small business; with the coming of war and the
priority systems, price controls, and defense contract
letting that followed, there were suddenly concrete problems
to be addressed and corrected.

Faced with these specific

problems, the Senate Small Business Committee began its
w ork«

CHAPTER II

THE COMMITTEE ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS OF
CONVERSION TO A WARTIME ECONOMY

For the First two years of World War II, the Senate
Small Business Committee dealt with problems confronting
small business enterprise brought about by the war economy.
It also managed to see that legislation was passed dealing
with a simplification of the vast amounts of reports which
various government agencies required business concerns to
submit to them.
The hearings conducted by the Committee and the
legislation which resulted from its investigations covered
a wide range of topics.

Starting with the freeze on auto

mobile production and distribution in January, 1942, and
continuing with various other forms of rationing, the
Committee hearings in the early war years also dealt with
insuring small business participation in t^e allocation
of government contracts.

Due to the shortages of various

strategic materials, especially copper and aluminum, the
Committee found itself engaged in investigations of the
mining industry as w<ell.
20

21
These hearings were often inconclusive because they
served primarily as a catharsis for business concerns faced
with problems which were largely unavoidable within the
framework of the wartime situation.

By allowing small

business interests to present their views to representatives
of the government agencies controlling prices, government
contracts, or rationed materials, the Committee did help to
eliminate certain specific injustices.

Furthermore, the

opportunity to have sympathetic Senators listen to their
problems usually led small businessmen to feel more patriotic,
if not otherwise better, about the many unavoidable sacri
fices which were expected of them.
The year 1941 began slowly for the Senate Small
Business Committee*

Until the prospect of United States

participation in the war became a virtual certainty, the
only action the Committee took was in researching and
supporting the Federal Reports Bill.

This legislation

sought to coordinate Federal reporting services to eliminate
duplication and to reduce the cost of those services to the
government while minimizing the burden to business of fur
nishing those reports.
Although Senate Resolution 1666, known as the Federal
Reports Act of 1941 > was submitted to the Senate on June 26,
1941 by Senator Mead on behalf of the Senate Small Business

22
Committee, the resolution was referred to the Committee on
Education and Labor where it rested for almost a year and a
half*

1

By that time the work of the Senate Small Business

Committee in response to the war effort had given a certain
respectability to its recommendations which had been lacking
in 1941 end the bill passed easily*

2

The primary reason that the Federal Reports Act
was not considered and passed until late in 1942, however,
was that with the declaration of war in December, 1941>
the Senate, and the Small Business Committee as well, found
themselves facing much more essential priorities which
required immediate action*

Chief among the problems con

cerning small business were rationing of scarce resources,
freezing orders, and the equitable granting of defense
contracts.
The first major crisis which the Senate Small Business
Committee investigated was precipitated by the automobile
freeze declared on January 1, 1942 by Donald M. Nelson,
Director of Priorities, Office of Production Management*
Leon Henderson of the Office of Price Administration, an
ancillary agency, explained the necessity for the freeze to
1
Congressional Record* 77 Cong*, 1 sess., 87•5531-32.
2
Ibid.* 77 Cong., 2 sess., 88:9079 and 9479.

the Committee on January 9, 1942 during a formal hearing
cbnducted at the request of the National Automobile Dealers
Association*

Henderson explained to the Committee and to

the automobile dealers attending the hearing why it had
become necessary to terminate the manufacture and sale of
automobiles *

Ho indicated that there had been two overriding

considerations:

first, the need to conserve essential mater

ials which were necessary for defense production; and second,
the requirement for facilities capable of producing an addi
tional eight to ten billion dollars worth of military goods*
When questioned about the suddenness of the freezing notice,
Henderson defended the apparent haste and reminded everyone
that if advance notice had been given, a run could have
resulted making it impossible to conserve the existing
stock of cars for priority uses.
Once the automobile freeze was announced, the Senate
Small Business Committee found that the automobile dealers
were faced with a variety of almost overwhelming problems.
With new car stocks frozen, the dealers had to rely on used
car sales and their service departments for all further
revenues.

Additionally, they still had to provide storage

3
U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 3. Con
ference of Retail Automobile Dealers. Hearings (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 529-530.

24
space for their inventories of new cars until the government
was able to take delivery or until rationed sales resumed.
The requirement for storage of stocks they could not sell for
what was expected to be an extended period of time proved
to be the major irritant for most of the automobile dealers.
Dealers resented the fact that they would have to bear an
estimated dollar-a-day expense for storing and maintaining
new cars which they would be unable to sell.

4

When the freeze

went into effect, approximately 450,000 new cars were in
the hands of the dealers.

5

L, Clare Cargile, President of the National Auto
mobile Dealers Association addressed the Senate Small Business
Committee during its hearings on January 9, 1942*

He pro

posed specific steps to be taken to help alleviate the burden
which had been placed upon the car dealers by the automobile
freeze.

Speaking almost directly to Leon Henderson of the

OPA, Cargile suggested:
1) that the government allow delivery of all
bona fide orders dated prior to January 1, 1942. He
estimated that this concession would affect roughly
five percent of the automobiles in question.
2) that if prices Were frozen on new cars,
rates be devised which would allow for handling
and freight charges.
4
I b i d .. p. 524*
5
Ibid., p. 519.

3) that if price ceilings were extended to used
cars, the same formula for handling be applied to
them,
4) that all automobiles and trucks which were
produced except those specifically designed for
military use be handled through dealers regardless
of their ultimate destination*
5) that all vehicles purchased by the government
from dealers be purchased at their full list price.
6) that the government pay for the cost of
financing, insurance, and storage on all vehicles
carried by the dealers after January 1, 1942 until
they were liquidated or released.
7) that the government agree to purchase at
retail delivery prices all vehicles, frozen or
subject to rationing, that dealers might offer
after July 1, 1942, and
8) that no restriction be placed on the sales
of non-standard vehicles such as limousines, con
vertibles, or specialty trucks.
As a direct result of the Committee hearings,
Leon Henderson agreed to:
1) permit delivery of cars in completion of
orders and sales which were made prior to the
freezing order of January 1.
2) establish a retail price ceiling in connec
tion with the rationing order which would provide
a reasonable margin of profit to the auto dealers
on the sale of cars being rationed*
This proposed
ceiling would equal the factory list price plus
Federal excise tax plus a transportation allow
ance plus a handling and delivery charge (to
equal five percent of the factory list price and
five percent of the transportation allowance, but
not to exceed seventy-five dollars)*

Ibid.* pp. 520-521.
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3)
increase the retail price ceiling each month,
starting February 1, at the rate of one percent of the
factory list price to recompense dealers for the expense
of storage, insurance, and interest.^
The Senate Small business Committee decided that
these concessions were not adequate, however, and agreed
that legislation to help automobile dealers, or dealers
in any other commodity which might be rationed or frozen
in the future, was necessary*

This legislation was to be

in addition to a $100,000,000 fund established by the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation for loans to auto dealers
to enable them to Carry their investment in the 204,000 cars
which were then completing production*

It also was in

addition to a Presidential request for Congress to make a
special appropriation of $300,000,000 for temporary relief
of employees of firms caught in the freeze. 8
The proposed legislation, Senate Bill 2315, was
drawn up as a result of the automobile freeze| however, its
provisions applied not only to the 44,000 automobile dealers
of the nation but also to any other persons or firms which
might be affected by similar rationing orders in the future*
Basically, what the Committee recommended was that the
7
U.S* Senate, 77 Cong*, 2 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 479.
Part 3 * (Washingtoni Government Printing Office, 1942),
pp. 1-4*
8

.

lb id ** pp. 63-65.
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Re construct ion Finance Corporation bo authorized to buy any
remaining stock in a resellable condition which had been
subject to rationing orders of any dealer in that commodity.
The RFC would also be empowered to loan those dealers an
amount equal to the investment they had in the rationed
article if that was the dealers* preference.

Initially the

Committee proposed that the RFC be directed to purchase the
remaining stock of any dealer making such a request if that
stock could not be liquidated within six months.
chase was to take place thirteen months

after

The pur

the date that

rationing commenced by a payment to the dealer of the retail
price of the article♦

This retail price would include the

dealers’ cost plus a reasonable charge for handling, servicing,
storing* and insuring the article*

9

In its final form,

however, the bill provided that the time period for liquida
tion be extended to eighteen months, and the Committee pointed
out that due to several liberalizing orders which the Office
of Price Administration had made since the initial freeze
went into effect, it was anticipated that residual stocks

.

subject to assumption by the RFC would be minimal.

10

The Committee anticipated that the proposed legis
lation would not result in the Reconstruction Finance

I bid.. p. 3.
^ Congressional Record. 77 Cong.* 2 sess., 88:3696.
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Corporation buying large quantities of rationed stocks.
Liquidation of existing stocks would be worked out by the
dealers and the RFC would serve only as a guarantor for the
prices of those stocks.

With the RFC guaranteeing prices,

dealers planning to stay in business would be encouraged to
buy inventories from those dealers trying to liquidate.
Additionally* the Committee anticipated that the RFC should
make a reasonable charge for its services and that the
liquidation of rationed stocks would not impose any financial
burden on the RFC or any other government agency.

11

Senate Bill 2315 was passed on April 27* 1942.
was returned signed by the President on May 11, 1942.

It

12

While the bill had actually been reported on the floor of
the Senate by the Banking and Currency Committee, it carried
the names of all seven members of the Senate Small Business
Committee and was clearly based upon their recommendations.
The automobile freeze and subsequent rationing
generated a great deal of interest in the press.

The New

York Times sympathetically reported the proposals made by
L. Clare Cargile for alleviating the blow to the automobile
dealers.

The Times also followed the work of the Senate

^ Report 479 . Part 3 * p* 4*i
12
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and 4081.
~^Ibid♦. p. 3696.

13
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Small Business Committee in this area thereby giving it
its first favorable publicity•^

No one attacked the actual

freeze or rationing of automobiles since they were convinced
that this action was necessary as the nation geared for allout war production, yet the work of the Committee to insure
that the blow was equalized and not made more damaging than
necessary to the small auto dealers of the nation apparently
did much to increase its prestige among small businessmen*
G.J* Seedman, President of the American Business
Congress, "the most influential small business organization
in America" stated in support of the Murray Committee that
National Automobile Association Dealers figures six months
after the rationing order took effect showed only a seven
percent mortality rate among auto dealers instead of the
fifty percent rate they had predicted;

15

The swift action

by the Committee through Senate Bill 2315 had generated
the first real signs of support from that nebulous business
community it had been trying so hard to woo.
While the members of the Senate Small Business
Committee were definitely sympathetic to the problems

~^New York Times* 2, 7* 10* and 11 January 1942.
1

New Republic. 2 October 1942, pp. 467-468. The
American Business Congress had been called "most influential"
by the Saturday Evening Post and was quoted by Seedman in
his letter to the New Republic*

confronting automobile dealers and others caught up in the
turmoil caused by the shift to a wartime economy, they made
it abundantly clear to all concerned that they were not out
to prevent individual business casualties but only intended
to soften the blow and enable small concerns to assume a
portion of the war production effort.

Even in the hearing

to investigate the problems facing the automobile dealers,
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts asked Cargile of
the National Automobile Dealers Association if there was any
possibility for using the car dealers* repair and machine
shop facilities in the execution of defense subcontracts.

16

With the war becoming more real every day, many
Senators developed the attitude that just as there must be
casualties on the battlefield, so there would be inevitable
casualties in the economic sector as well.

The fear that

men like Murray had was that by making an all-out effort
to defeat the enemy abroad, the free enterprise system would
be detroyed at home,

A bit of doggerel was read into the

minutes of the hearing on Retail Automobile Dealers which
had been printed previously in The Saturday Evening Post.
It read:
16

U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee
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Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 527.
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Big business has become immense
Because of contracts for defense5
And little business, thanks to Hitler,
Is definitely getting littler.
Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri, who like
Lodge had been one of the many concerned legislators
attending the hearing commented:
That is just as true as can b e . Big business
is getting bigger, and little business is going
out of business. We are all going to have to
make sacrifices in this situation, and everybody
has a different situation. But it seems to me
your situation and that of the farmers of America
can be worked out on a gradual basis so as to
keep you in business and keep the country running.
Because what is the use of saving the country if
we d o n !t have anything left when we do save it? -*-7
The relative success that the Committee achieved in
the adoption of its proposals concerning automobile dealers
proved to be short-lived when the Committee moved on to
the problems faced by independent tire‘ dealers.

Hearings

conducted in March, 1942 resulted in a legislative proposal
(Senate Bill 2560) which was tabled as soon as it was sub
mitted and then was not re-introduced for the remainder of
the year.

18

In 1943 another attempt to revive the bill was

tried but it too failed to gain more than token support
since the constitutionality of the proposal Was very much
in doubt from the beginning.

Still, certain recommendations

^ Ibid ., p. 565*
18
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made by the Senate Small Business Committee as a result of
its investigations were adopted for implementation by the
presidentially-appointed Baruch Committee which was formed
Specifically to deal with the rubber shortage.

lo

The tire problem was precipitated by the lack of
crude rubber created by enemy takeover of Far Eastern
suppliers and the fact that no suitable substitute for rubber
had yet been commercially developed*

As the Committee

studied the resulting tire shortage, it saw a need to encourage
the survival of the approximately 60,000 independent tire
dealers and service stations throughout the country who were
the only ones the Committee found to maintain consistently
a distribution system for the sale of tires and who especially
catered to servicing, repairing, and rebuilding tires*
These latter functions were considered' to be of vital
importance to the rubber conservation program.

20

In addition to the independent tire dealers, the
SenatecSmall Business Committee found that two other sources
for tire distribution existed*

These were through the

19 U.S.. Senate, 78 Cong*, 1 sess*, Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 1 2 *
Part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943),
p. 8*
20

U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 479*
Part 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942),
P* 5*

corporate chain stores such as Sears or Montgomery Ward and
through tire and rubber manufacturer-owned stores like
Firestone and the General Tire Company.

These dealers were

not hurt by the rationing of tires, the Committee believed,
since chain Stores handled many other items and could absorb
the loss in revenue created by the rationing of tires and
the rubber and tire manufacturers had received a large volume
of government contracts which more than compensated them for
the loss of tire sales.

21

Basically, what the Senate Small Business Committee
recommended in Senate Bills 2560 (1942) and 1122 (1943)»
neither of which won the approval of Congress, was that all
distribution of new and rebuilt tires and tubes be handled
through independent tire dealers.

This special treatment

they believed to be Justified since other tire dealers did
their major business in different items while the independent
tire dealers depended upon tire sales for their subsistence.
For purposes of the legislation, independent tire dealers
were defined as any persons engaged in the sales and ser
vicing of tires whose primary business consisted of one or
more of the following:

selling or servicing (but not

manufacturing) tires, automobile or automotive equipment,
—
'
21Ibid., p. 2.
22T, ..
Ibid.
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selling motor vehicle fuels and lubricants, or repairing,
recapping, or retreading tires*

23

One of the biggest, changes in policy which resulted
from the Committee hearings on tires was the adoption by
the Baruch Rubber Committee of the proposal that the recapping
Of an old tire not necessitate the use of a tire rationing
card.^

The fact that it was the independent tire dealers

who did the vast majority of recapping meant that in some
ways the tire shortage had actually worked to their
25
advantage.
The tire situation was a complex one, even more
involved than that of the automobile dealers.

Once the

President set up an independent rubber committee with a
Rubber Administrator appointed to supervise the shortage,
the Senate Small Business Committee seemed quite relieved
to turn their attention to other, more general, and seemingly
less complicated topics.

While their investigations did

enable them to make important suggestions which were later
carried out, in part at least, by the Rubber Administrator,
23

Ibid , « p. 7.

^ U . S . Senate, 78 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 19* Tire
Dealer and Rebuilder Problems: I I . Hearings (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1943), P* 2537.
Ibid.. pp. 2636-2637.
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the Committee had neither the time, interest, nor background
knowledge to delve more deeply into an area of such uncer
tainty.

The dubious legality of their proposed rubber

legislation further indicated that it was intended more to
appease the tire dealers than to actually change government
policy to allow preferential treatment in the distribution
of tires.
While other items were also in short supply or rationed,
the Senate Small Business Committee did not again consider
legislation to deal with particular situations.

The Committee

did, however, proceed with its hearings into specific matters,
and through these hearings, in which small business repre
sentatives were brought face-to-face with officials from
the OPA, certain accommodations were sometimes reached.
Hearings were held in April, 1943 on the rationing problems
confronting the baking industry and in June the Committee
considered the problems facing the poultry and livestock
distributors and dealers which were occuring because of
rationing orders in those commodities.

Although the

Committee served primarily as a source of sympathy for the
livestock and poultry dealers, the independent bakers were

36
able bo reach an accommodation with the OPA which allowed
their production of bread actually to increase.

26

At the same time it was investigating ways to aid
dealers in rationed commodities, the Senate Small Business
Committee was also putting together a comprehensive proposal
aimed at insuring small business participation in war
production*

On March 31, 1942, Senator Murray offered

S-2250, variously known as the Murray-Patman Act (after
the Chairmen of the Senate and House Small Business Committees),
or the Smaller War Plants Act.

27

In a background report submitted by the Committee on
February 5 of that year, the fundamental difficulties facing
small businesses were assessed.

The major problem the

Committee saw was that of procurement and the fact that the
Office of Production Management (which' became the War
Production Board), the Army, Navy, and Treasury all preferred
to deal with large businesses rather than smaller concerns
which were thought to be less reliable and more inefficient
in fulfilling defense contracts.

Because most of the

individuals in charge of procurement for these agencies
26

U.S. Senate, 79 Cong*, 1 sess*, Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 4 7 .
Part 1 (Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1945),
pp. 23-27*
^ Congressional Record. 77 Cong*, 2 sess., 88:3225-6*
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had always been associated with big business, the Committee
believed the only way to assure fair treatment for small
plants and to utilize fully the productive capabilities of
the nation was to create a board having centralized power
to directly represent the interests of small business.

28

The Committee believed there was a very real danger
that under the pressure for an all-out war effort, production
would be administered so as to cause needless and irreparable
damage to small business.

The examples of the tire and

automobile freezes were cited in which the decisions of one
administrator had the power to destroy thousands of business
concerns literally overnight.

Representation for small

business on policy-making boards as a check against illconsidered decisions was deemed essential if small business
Was to survive the war intact.

The "dollar-a-year,f men

who had come to dominate various government agencies during
the war and who were all representatives of big business
interests had no counterpart among small businessmen.

While

small businesses could not support their own Mdollar-a-yearn
men, the Senate Small Business Committee wanted to insure
that they at least had a voice within the government.
28
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During its hearings in December, 1941, the Committee
heard testimony from Stacy May, Chief of the Bureau of
Research and Statistics of the Office of Production Management*
His figures indicated that there was a whole level of indus
trial capacity in the nation that had not been touched for
military production.

Floyd Odium, Director for the

Division of Contract Distribution and himself an example of
the inroads big business had made into government circles,
substantiated this finding by stating that at least 20,000
more manufacturing plants could be brought into the war
production effort.

This would mean that approximately one-

quarter of all small manufacturers could convert completely
to the war effort, while another one-fourth could be partly
adapted.^
Although most people agreed that a vast untapped
resource of war production was to be found in the small
businesses of the nation, few were certain about how it could
best be utilized.

And while the doubt remained unresolved,

more businesses were forced to close their doors due to a
lack of critical materials and other war-related problems.
30

U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 1 .
D e c e m b e r 15. 16. 17. 18. and 19. 1941. Hearings (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 17-20.
^ Ibid. . p. 232.
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Dun and Bradstreet figures for the first year of the defense
program indicated that bankruptcies of small businesses had
increased dramatically over those of 1939 while the rate for
.

big business failures during the same period had plummeted*

32

This evidence was considered to be even more damning
when compared to the figures presented by Stacy May which
showed that fifty-six of America’s 184*230 manufacturing
companies were awarded seventy-five percent of all Army and
Navy contracts.

The remaining twenty-five percent of the

defense contracts were distributed among about 16,000 prime
contractors*

Thirteen billion dollars had been spent or

allocated by the government for plant expansion for big
business but no consideration had been given for the expanion
of small business.

33

Presidential efforts to include small business in
the war effort had also been thwarted*

Roosevelt had organ

ized the Division of Contract Distribution in the 0PM in an
attempt to help small business during the war but it too
proved ineffective just as its predecessors the Defense
Contract Service and the Office of Small Business Activities
had also failed.

The Committee believed that such attempts

to aid small business would continue to prove unsuccessful
32

Ibid.. p. 114.
Report 479. Part 2 * pp. 6-7.
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as long as small business representatives were only a
powerless part of the Office of Production Management domi
nated fey big business interests*

With the formation of the

War Production Board and the centralization it brought about
in the administration of Wartime production* the Committee
believed progress was being made*

Yet* if small business

was to fee protected* the Committee felt adequate representa
tion

of its interests on the WPB was essential.^
Senate Bill 2250 was introduced in the Senate by the

Small Business Committee in an effort to deal with this lack
of representation given small business both in wartime
production* and more importantly* in the decision-making
which affected that production*

Section I gave additional

authority to the Chairman of the War Production Board and
made

it his duty* through an appointed deputy* to mobilize

aggressively the productive capacity of all small business
concerns and to determine how they could be most effectively
used to augment war production*

Section II gave power to a

Smaller War Plants Corporation (Section IV) to encourage
small business through the granting of government contracts*
Section III provided that the chairman of the WPB would
gather information about the capacity of small business for
i

War production*

This was to be accomplished by making

^ Ibid** pp« 9“10*
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inventories of existing goods* directing the attention of
government officials to the productive capability of small
plants, and providing for the letting of subcontracts by prime
contractors.

Additionally, he was to encourage through

government contracts the conversion of small plants to war
production, and provide through the Smaller War Plants
Corporation and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the
necessary funds for this conversion.

Finally, the measure

provided for the creation of the Smaller War Plants
Corporation with a capital stock of $100,000,000 (later
increased to $150,000,000)*

This corporation was to be

staffed by experts in small business management, engineers,
and others who could make a study of small businesses with
the idea of bringing them fully into the wartime economy,
enabling them to get government contracts, and by so doing,
speeding up the production of war materials.

The Smaller

War Plants Corporation would not itself engage in manufacturing,
It would merely act as a prime contractor, letting sub
contracts to smaller concerns.

Additionally, it would

finance the expansion of small businesses to enable them to
produce war materials mpre effectively.
Senator Murray indicated in introducing the bill
that at first the idea was to have the RFC finance aid to
35
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small business, but it was finally decided that it would be
more effective, and quicker, to let the Smaller War Plants
Corporation handle financing as well.

Collection of loans

made by the SWPC would revert to the RFC, however, since it
A/

already had the machinery set up to handle repayment.
The bill was also designed to benefit those plants
wishing to convert to essential civilian production, especially
to aid them in obtaining critical raw materials needed for
their operations.

It did not address the problems confront

ing the small distributor or retailer, however, as became
all too clear in the months following implementation.

37

Senator Murray led off the debate on Senate Bill
2250 by saying:
1 am sure that the problem of small business in
the nation is the most serious problem affecting
the country, because if we permit small business
to be destroyed, we shall destroy the American way
of life.
Our democratic system was founded upon
small business enterprise, and if it shall be
wiped out, and if the whole field of business
endeavor shall be taken over by the big monopo
listic concerns of the nation, then we shall have
a totalitarian system, we shall have communism
or facism.38

3 Ibid.. p. 3226.
37

This problem will be discussed more fully later.
See page 46 for additional information.
38
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Perhaps the biggest question raised against Senate
Bill 2250 came from Senator Harry P. Byrd of Virginia,

He

Was concerned about a provision which would allow the Smaller
War Plants Corporation to 11purchase or lease such land, to
• • . • build, or expand such plants.”

He felt the problem

might be that there were already too many small businesses
and was concerned that under the provisions of the bill even
more marginally productive enterprises would be built.
Senator Taft answered this objection by pointing out that
even proposed construction was no more than what the govern
ment had already done for big business.

Why should not smaller

concerns have the same privilege, he asked.

39

Another minor debate centered around whether or not
the SWPC should have financing powers.

Several Senators

believed that this power should remain

with the RFC*

Senator Prentiss M. Brown of Michigan (who later became
Director of the OPA after his defeat in a senatorial campaign)
pointed out that under the provisions of the proposed bill,
money would be loaned on the basis of whether business pro
duction would be advantageous to national defense.

This was

not true of the RFC which based decisions on whether the
business was reasonably assured of repaying the loan.
1
Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri furthered this line
39

Ibid,. pp. 3229-3230.
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of reasoning by pointing out that the bill would remedy
the problem of small business not being able to bid on
contracts because they could not get funding, and not being
able to get financing without being assured of a bid.

The

vicious cycle created between the War Department and the
RFC would foe Cured by the Smaller War Plants Corporation,
he thought*

40

After other generalised discussion on the measure,
Senator Murray proposed an amendment providing for penalties
for misuse of the provisions of the bill.

Senator Brown

offered an amendment authorizing the War Department and the
Department of the Navy to participate in or guarantee any
loans made pursuant to the A c t .

The Senate adopted the

amendments and on April 1, 1942 passed the bill without
dissent.^
The companion House bill provided for the suspension
of anti-trust laws for the duration of the war in addition
to the proposals contained in the Senate version*

This

stipulation angered Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin
who found it ironic that such a rider should appear on a
measure designed to aid small business*

He moved that the

bill be returned to conference until this discrepancy could
40
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be worked out and on May 27, 1942 the Senate agreed to
LaFollette1s m o t i o n . ^
When the conference report was submitted on June 4*
however, it, still allowed the Chairman of the War Production
Board almost exclusive authority to suspend anti-trust laws
with respect to agreements and procedures necessary to the
war effort.

The only modification which came out of confer

ence was that the Chairman of the WPB would be required to
consult the Attorney General.

He did not, however, have to

ask his permission for any actions the WPB might undertake.
At the end of the war, the Chairman, at his own discretion,
would withdraw his orders and allow the anti-trust laws to
again take effect.

With only minimal debate, the Senate

immediately agreed to the conference report and the Smaller
War Plants Corporation was created.

43

The Smaller War Plants Corporation under the
direction of Lou Holland soon encountered difficulties in
getting organized and in providing aid to small concerns.

44

In October, an article in Business Week suggested that
42
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Holland had been the organizer of a 32-company pool
in Kansas City which had been formed to obtain Navy defense
contracts.
He served as first director of SWPC but his
success in government was not what it had been as a private
businessman and he was soon replaced.
See Business W e e k .
18 July 1942, p. 7 and 16 October 1943, p. 15*
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perhaps Holland was intimidated by the amount of money he
had at his disposal.

The magazine also speculated that:

possibly Holland can’t be criticized for assuming
that there is no lack of riders for a gravy train, but
the champions on Capitol Hill are becoming dissatis
fied With Holland*s deliberate policy.
Senator
Murray, Chairman of the Senate Small Business Committee,
has.been preoccupied with getting re-elected and
Murray’s committee regards SWPC as its baby, conse
quently doesn’t want to spank it too soon. But
Senators Mead, Bllender, Stewart and others are now
urging Murray to put SWPC on the carpet.45
Business Week Went on to discuss the serious problems
facing the nation’s retailers which provisions of the Smaller
War Plants Act completely ignored.

It quoted a Commerce

Bepartment forecast which predicted a net contraction of
300,000 retailers by the end of 1943*

The Senate Small

Business Committee had not taken so pessimistic a view, it
suggested, probably because there was no strong retailers
lobby in Washington to Convince them otherwise.

Instead,

the Committee seemed to feel that by tightening their belts
along with continued pressure on OPA to puncture ceiling
prices and the WPB to route greater quantities of materials
into civilian channels, the wholesalers and retailers of the
nation could survive the War, if not unscathed, at least
virtually intact.

The article closed by saying that ’’this

disinterested, if not cool attitude in Congress to the

45
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plight of retailers is expected to change very quickly when
46
the casualties begin to mount.”

That the Committee1s

approach to the problems of retailers did not change markedly
bespeaks the success that their pressure on the OPA and WPB
achieved *
In investigating the price ceilings and standardiza
tion orders issued by the Office of Price Administration in
1943 9 the Senate Small Business Committee served primarily
as an arbiter between small retailers and distributors and
the O P A .

Although they may have wanted to play a more

aggressive role in the protection of small retailers, an
exchange between Senator Wherry and J.K. Galbraith represent
ing the OPA during a Committee hearing in May, 1943 indicated
that choices were extremely limited and that all options had
both pros and cons, some which might hurt smaller concerns
even more than others.

The discussion concerned criticism

leveled against the OPA by representatives of small retail
establishments for its orders standardizing the making of
rayon hoisery and forthcoming proposals to standardize
various other commodities.

This standardization order

which Would virtually do away with brand name identifications,
was to be coupled with price ceilings for the various items.
In an attempt to aid the small retailers in buying articles

46Ibid.

from manufacturers in competition with chain stores who could
easily absorb all production and thereby completely undercut
the independents, the OPA had set price ceilings for inde
pendents higher than for chain stores.

What this meant was

that the small retailer could then offer the manufacturer
more for his product than could the chain store, and this
price differential would thereby enable the independents to
j

'

*

purchase goods they might hot be able to buy Otherwise.
What the retailers and the Senate Small Business Committee
Criticized, however, Was that this policy virtually assured
the fact that a customer would either pay more for his pur
chases from an independent retailer^ or that the retailer,
in ah effort to compete with the chain stores^ would have to
sell the merchandise at a loss.
Dr. Galbraith replied that the Complexities of the
market system prevented other Options.

He explained that

while the OPA had established ceilings for the purchase
Of commodities, thehe had been no attempt to set minimum
prices;

HO saw the possibility that this might even work

to the advantage Of the independent hetailer;

If the

independent retailer were able to Obtain his toefChandise for
a few Cents over what the chain stores paid, he would still
be able tO sell those goods Cbhtpeiiiively, especially in smaller
Communities in Which chain stbfes had not made significant

49
inroads, he argued.

The crux of the problem was in obtaining

a balance between the conflicting segments of the economy.
What the OPA had attempted to do as Galbraith explained was:
to take the situation as nearly as possible as
we find it, making only those changes which are
necessary in order to keep the order down to a
reasonably simple form.
The more you elaborate
and the more allowances you make, of course, the
more complicated the order becomes.47
Galbraith summarized the choices available to the
OPA in establishing ceiling prices.

Since chain stores were

automatically able to sell products for less than independents
they could have set prices high enough for independents to
be happy*

This would have served to give the chain stores

an added margin of profit.

If, on the other hand, the OPA

had set prices which were realistic for chain stores, smaller
retailers would have been unable to make a profit and would
have been forced out of business entirely.

The third choice

was to establish two ceilings, even though this put the
price differential clearly into public view.

The OPA,

however, believed this to be the least of the three evils.
The price freezing that had been used previously clearly
benefitted those businesses and/or communities which had
lower prices at the base date while it encouraged dealings in
47
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black market activities.

This problem had become acute in

the meat and poultry markets and by setting new price ceilings the OPA was attempting to correct past mistakes.

AR

The biggest disparity between points of view held
by the OPA and the Senate Small Business Committee resulted
from the fact that they had entirely different interests to
protect*

The OPA, as Galbraith pointed out, was set up to

protect the consumer, while the Small Business Committee,
although not insensitive to the needs of the consumer, was
primarily interested in the welfare of small businesses.
The conflict that resulted was not resolved until 1946 when
President Truman finally dismantled the

O P A .
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That the

Committee did not become more deeply involved with the
policies of the OPA during the early war years can partly
be attributed to the fact that other matters, particularly
wartime production, took priority.

The change that occurred

during later years can be at least partly attributed to the
more prominent role Senator Wherry came to play on the
Committee•
Wherry and Tom Stewart were members of the subcommittee
on complaints which came to do the majority of work dealing
48

Ibid.. pp. 3007-3008.
i
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The problems encountered when price controls were
ended only illustrates this disparity as shall be discussed
more fully in Chapter III.

with price regulation.

Other Committee members, and

especially Senator Murray, were more involved with small
manufacturers, particularly in the mining industry, and
later in reconversion and the postwar problems of small
enterprises*

These differences in emphasis were perhaps

not so surprising when the backgrounds of Wherry and Murray
are compared*

Aside from the obvious party differences,

both would seem to have much in common coming as they did
from Nebraska and Montana, both western states with rela
tively small urban populations.

Wherry was a small town

retailer while the businesses Murray was familiar with as
a long time resident of Butte, the copper capital of the
nation, were of an entirely different sort*
The biggest difference between the views of Murray
and Wherry were, of course, political*
Dealer and a committed liberal.

Murray was a New

He was a strong supporter

of labor in his position as Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Education and Labor and he was one of the most vocal
supporters of anti-trust activities after the war.

Wherry,

on the other hand, was conservative and somewhat provincial
in his outlook*

He saw the threat of big government to be

as bad as that of big business since there was no force to
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regulate government if it became too s t r o n g . I n
December, 1945 a series of hearings to investigate the
impact of price controls and stabilization policies on
small business were conducted•

As will become even more

apparent in Chapter III, Senators Murray and Wherry had
entirely different goals in mind when dealing with the
Office of Price Administration.
The conflict over military production versus essen
tial civilian production was another area in which the
Senate Small Business Committee was unable to provide clear
guidance.

Although the Smaller War Plants Corporation was

authorized to aid concerns dealing in those essential
civilian commodities, no one was able to provide a good
definition of what exactly they might be.

All were agreed

that food, clothing, and shelter were examples but what
about cars for workers to get to factories, or household
"conveniences" for the increased numbers of working women?
General Robert W. Johnson,
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who took over as director of

This information was generalized from H.A*
Dalstrom, nKenneth S. Wherry," (unpublished Ph.D. disser
tation, Department of History, University of Nebraska,
1965)3 "James E . Murray,M Who Was Who in America. Vol. IV,
1961-1968 (St. Louis: Marquis, Inc., Von Hoffman Press,
1968), p. 6915 and New York Times. 24 March 1961*
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Johnson was on a leave of absence from Johnson
and Johnson for the w a r 1s duration. He served as an Army
Procurement Officer prior to assuming the post as director

SWPC from Lou Holland until the conflict over reconversion
forced him to resign* summarized the difficulty when he said
that nwhen women have to stay home to do the family washing
/rather than go to work in a defense ^-related jobJ f a washing
CO

machine becomes as important as a bomber •,?

While this

might have been an exaggeration* it did illustrate the many
conflicting priorities that the War Production Board had to
consider when making decisions*

If war needs and civilian

consumer needs had been the only considerations* the task
would still have been monumental* but what the Senate Small
Business Committee was asking* additionally* was that all
these needs be fulfilled while at the same time helping
smaller businesses survive and compete.

This conflict

became even more pronounced in 1943-1944 when the Committee
attempted to make plans for reconversion from the wartime
economy to a postwar one*
Floyd Odium* in early testimony before the Committee*
had attempted to push for a division in the economy whereby
large manufacturers would handle war supplies while small

of SWPC*
See U.S. Senate* 77 Cong.* 2 sess.* Special
Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business*
Part 10* Smaller Concerns in War Production: I * Hearings
(Washington: Government Printing Office* 1942), p. 1132.
5b u s i n e s s W e e k . 16 October 1943, p. 15.
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businesses would supply essential civilian needs.
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This

suggestion had been discarded in the formulation of the
Smaller War Plants Corporation plan* yet in a statement
before the Committee on October 15* 1942* L t . General Brehon
B, Somervell* Commander, Supply Services* War Department*
indicated that even so this idea was still very much alive
among procurement officers.

He summarized the policy of the

War Department which* although it called for spreading the
production load over the broadest possible base* nevertheless
specified that simpler items were to be placed with smaller
manufacturers to allow more capacity for production in the
larger plants.

It also stipulated that existing production

lines were not to be slowed down or stopped in order to
place the work with small plants not then having war work.
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Although the Committee investigations Coupled with the
activities of the SWPC gradually increased the numbers of
small concerns engaged in war production so that by December*
1942 Somervell could boast that sixty-five percent of all
Army contracts were with small businesses (plants employing
53
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500 people or less according to the general’s definition),^5
the unresolved question was still who should get which
scarce materials to produce what commodities?
Senator Murray gave a succinct statement of the
scarcity problem when he made an opening remark to a hearing
conducted on January 13 , 1943 on critical, strategic, and
essential materials.

As he said,

It is generally acknowledged that one of the
biggest obstacles to the fuller utilization of
smaller plants in war production is the shortage of
steel, copper, aluminum, and other basic metals
which constitute the life blood of the war indus
tries. * . . This Committee looks upon the thousands
of small mine operators as part and parcel of the
small business enterprise of the land, which must
participate to the fullest extent in the war effort.
Operators of small mines have testified before this
Committee to the effect that the War Production
Board has failed to help them expand the production
of essential materials.
At the same time the war
construction program has brought about an overexpansion of plant facilities which cannot be fully
exploited because of a shortage of strategic metals
and minerals.56
In a statement before the Committee, Harold L.
IckeS, Secretary of the Interior, called for the utilization
of low-grade ores even if that meant increasing the price
cc

U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 1 1 .
SmallerConcerns in War Production: I I . Hearings (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 1485*
56U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 1 3 «
Critical. Strategic, and Essential Materials. Hearings
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 1801.
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ceilings on the metals involved so that the added expense
involved in mining them would be justified.
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He coupled

this suggestion with others involving the use of technological
breakthroughs and with having processing plants co-located
CO

with the mines to decrease transportation costs.
In February, 1943> Murray received increased support
for his interest in critical and strategic materials with
the appointment to the Committee of James G. Scrugham, an

,

ex“engineer from Nevada who had previously been a strong
Supporter of mining interests as a member of the House and
had received warm praise from Ickes for his work

t h e r e .

^9

C. Douglass Buck of Delaware was also an engineer and a
welcome addition to the Small Business Committee.
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These

two men composed the newly-formed subcommittee on the mining
and minerals industry.
During April and August, 1943> this new subcommittee
conducted a series of field hearings on critical strategic,
and essential materials.

Although not officially a member of

Ibid,. p. 1821.
18

J Ibid.. pp. 1819-1820.
59Ibid.. o. 1821.
60
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this subcommittee, Murray continued to be very involved
with this subject and conducted the August field hearings
personally.

(That the Senator was also seeking re-election

and that the hearings he conducted took place in Montana
gives added insight into Murrayfs interest.)
Although these investigations also resulted in
several pieces of legislation of a technical nature to benefit
smaller mine owners, the biggest contributions had nothing
to do with legislation.

Instead they served as a catalyst

between the mining industry and government agencies.

As

Prentiss M. Brown, successor to Leon Henderson of the OPA
told the committee:
This office has reviewed carefully the digests
of the field hearings during April before your sub
committee on mining and minerals industry, which
you have been kind enough to make available for
our u s e • • • • In reviewing the measures taken
since that time under this program, we find that
at least six of the operators, who indicated to
your committee a need for higher revenues, have
already been assigned special copper quotas,
yielding premiums in addition to the premium of
^
five cents per pound of copper formally available.
Thus it was that by allowing the smaller concerns of the
nation to voice their views publicly, the Committee was
able to bring about concessions in many areas.
61

Moreover,

U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 29.
Critical. Strategic, and Essential Materials: V I . Hearings
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943)* p. 3836.

even when concessions were not forthcoming, the very fact
that someone in Washington was actually listening to them
apparently did wonders for the morale of small businessmen,
John T * Sullivan, a businessman from Helena, Montana summed
up this attitude at the end of a small business field
hearing when he said:
1 think we should pass a resolution thanking Mr.
Daughters /the special consultant to the Senate Small
Business Committee./ for his cooperation and also
thanking Senator Murray.
I think his taking up the
cudgel for the small businessmen is one of the finest
things that has been done.
I think the way he is
following through is very commendable.^
In the rush to take on wartime problems, legislation
attempting to reduce the mountain of government reports re
quired of small business almost became lost*

Although the

proposal, known as the Federal Reports Act, was submitted
before Pearl Harbor, the priority of the war shifted it to
a secondary position.

It was not reconsidered and passed

until December 11, 1942.

Even so, the Act did recognize

an increasingly burdensome problem faced by small businessmen
particularly, and in many ways this legislation proved to
have more lasting results than did other measures dealing
with more transitory situations brought about by the conflict.
62
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The measure provided that information needed by the
government was to be obtained by imposing the minimum burden
upon business enterprise (particularly small business) and
at a minimum cost to the government.

All unnecessary dup

lication of effort in obtaining information through reports,
questionnaires, etc. was to be eliminated as rapidly as
possible.

In order to carry out these objectives, the

Director of the Bureau of the Budget was empowered to:
1) investigate the needs of various agencies for reports
from the public and from other government agencies; 2) in
vestigate the methods used to obtain the information; and
3) coordinate as soon as possible the reporting services
of all such agencies to reduce the cost to the government
and the burden to the public such reports caused.

What,

in effect, the Act did was to force government agencies to
furnish information to each other when that information
was not of a confidential n a t u r e . ^

Ease of reporting for

business concerns, along with passing references to govern
ment economy, was considered more important than decentrali
zation of statistical services into each department of
government.

Decentralization of information-gathering

functions was still allowed, however, as long as coordination
existed to prevent unnecessary duplication.
63

Report 479. Part 1 . pp. 3-4.
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Three years after the passage of the Federal Reports
Act, the Senate Small Business Committee assessed the progress
that had been made.

It indicated that the problem which had

existed prior to the war had been intensified during the
war years.

Yet the Committee believed that the Federal

Reports Act had kept the problem from ballooning.

It pointed

to the fact that complaints concerning government reports
had decreased considerably since passage of the Act.

Specific

government forms that had been simplified or discontinued
were cited as Were examples in which the frequency of infor
mation collection had been decreased.

It also pointed to

certain instances in which small concerns had been completely
exempted from reports requirements due to a lack of manpower
or because they did not comprise a substantial part of a
given industry.

Simplification in forms also took place

and examples were given in which certain OPA forms had been
cut from twenty-three pages to four pages.

Also, concessions

to the way in which small businesses kept their accounts
were often made so that the government agencies, in effect,
asked the right questions rather than requiring the individual
businesses to do many recomputations•^
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Letters of appreciation which the Committee received
from organizations such as the American Retail Federation*
U.S. Chamber of Commerce* National Association of Manufacturers*
and the National Industrial Council indicate that this was
one of the most popular measures endorsed by the Committee*
This is understandable considering the lack of opposition
to the measure* even within the government*

No one at the

time seemed concerned with the consolidation of masses of
information into easily accessible and widely used govern
ment reports which this law allowed.

The coming of computer

technology probably would have fostered this trend sooner
or later* but it is interesting to note in the light of
later fears over the uses for such staggering amounts of
data in centralized locations that in the 1940’s the only
concern was for increased efficiency.
In retrospect* the years 1941 through 1943 were
busy and productive* yet somewhat chaotic for the Senate
Small Business Committee.

Reacting to the demands of a

now quite vocal interest group* the Committee sought to
ease the problems of the automobile freeze* the tire
rationing program* and the need to include small manufac
turers in wartime production.

They also delved into OPA
i
pricing practices* asked important if unanswerable questions

65Ibid.. pp. 22-23.
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about military production Versus essential civilian needs*
arid investigated government policies regarding shortages in
certain critical materials.
Three major pieces of legislation were proposed
and passed.

Senate Bill 2315 provided relief for dealers

in rationed commodities and resulted from the automobile
freeze imposed in January* 1942.

Senate Bill 2256 established

the Smaller War Plants Corporation which did a great deal
to insure that small manufacturers were also able to parti
cipate in defense contracts. ■ Finally* Senate Resolution
1666* enacted in December* 1942* attempted to limit the
amount of paperwork required by the government and thereby
reduced the burden on businesses that these reports created.
The Committee also served as a catalyst by bringing
together small business interests and representatives of
government agencies which so often controlled their fate.
These face-to-face encounters sponsored by a group of
Senators sympathetic to the needs of small business probably
did more to help small concerns survive and prosper than
any amount of legislation could possibly have done.

Not

only did specific changes result from these confrontations
between businessmen and government officials* but because
the government officials realized that their decisions

might have to be defended at a Senate Small Business
Committee hearing* the constraints on their actions which
this realization fostered had immeasureable* but nonetheless

CHAPTER III

THE COMMITTEE AND RECONVERSION

By the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944* a
definite change in perspective became apparent within the
Senate Small Business Committee.

With victory becoming

more certain* the Committee began to explore the questions of
reconversion and its effects upon the smaller concerns of
the nation.

Contract cancellations, equitable allocation

of still scarce resources* and disposal of vast amounts of
government surplus commodities were all topics which had
to be dealt with as the war wound to an end.

The question

of price controls also continued to be important especially
as the post-war economy developed and the possibility of
inflation became more certain.

Finally, the role of the

Committee itself* and its creation* the Smaller War Plants
Corporation* came into question as it became more and more
apparent that prosperity* rather than the feared depression*
was to follow the war.

The conflict which prosperity

inspired over the continued need for government regulation
i

of the economy was apparent within the Committee itself in
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th$ opposing views of Senators Murray and Wherry.

This

conflict culminated in the election of 1946 when the
Republicans won a majority in the Senate, and Wherry
replaced Murray as Chairman of the Small Business Committee•
Initial moves toward reconversion began 'in October,
1943 when Robert W. Johnson resigned as the Director of the
Smaller War Plants Corporation.

He had wanted to shift

smaller plants to civilian production since he believed
that the utilization of businesses in the war effort had
reached a saturation point and that by continuing to gear
smaller plants for war work, the process of reconversion
would be made that much more difficult for them.

His

suggestions met with violent opposition from Robert P.
Patterson, Undersecretary of War, and Lt * Gen. Brehon B.
Somervell, Chief of the Army Service Forces.

They con*-

vinced Donald M. Nelson of the War Production Board that
this was a totally irresponsible attitude to have while
the nation was still very much at war, so Nelson requested
Johnson’s resignation
Yet this sudden rift was not completely unexpected.
The Smaller War Plants Corporation had had problems almost
from its inception.

In a series of closed hearings called

to investigate the effectiveness of the SWPC during the
1
Business W e e k . 16 October 1943 > P* 15*
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summer of 1943> 'the Senate Small Business Committee came
to the conclusion that drastic changes in personnel and
administrative policy were necessary if the SWPC was to
function at all as it had been designed to do.

Part of

the difficulty could be clearly traced to the reluctance
of the War Department to work with the SWPC in developing
the potential capacity of small business for particular
procurement needs.

However, the Smaller War Plants

Corporation itself Was also to blame for its failure to
aggressively aid small concerns, the Committee contended.
The SWPC was Often overly cautious in its financing policies
/.-.andjifehe//efsfcetcise'"of ;?its;;iaubeontrabti,hg powers had too often
■ remained unused.

'

,

•.: '

Under J o h n s o n s administration, some of these
deficiencies had been corrected and a better working rela
tionship With government procurement officers was developed
perhaps?because of Johnson* s previous assignment as an
V'..'
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3

Army procurement officer prior to assuming the SWPC post.
He moved to decentralise the Smaller War Plants Corporation
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by setting up fourteen regional offices to work directly
with the military procurement officers in each area so that
smaller plants in every district could be better utilized.
A record of prime and subcontracts placed with small
business by the Corporation also showed marked improvement
during Johnsonrs administration while the amount of loans to
small businessmen increased as well.

4

Johnson!s biggest problem was that he began to think
and talk about reconversion about a year before anyone else
did.

By 1944 the Senate Small Business Committee was even

conducting a series of field hearings to get businessmen's
opinions concerning reconversion and had actively sponsored
legislation to insure that small business interests would
be protected in a post-war economy* but in 1943 Johnson
5
was slightly ahead of his time.
The end of the war was becoming ever more apparent
and by 1944 the biggest problem facing business, both large
and small, was created by government cutbacks in defense
contracts.

This difficulty was dramatized in May of that

year when the Navy cancelled its contract with the Brewster
Aeronautic Company for the manufacture of Corsair aircraft.
Although Brewster Aeronautic could not be considered a

^Report 47. Part X . p. 7-11*
5Ibid.
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small enterprise, employing as it did 10,000 persons, it
is interesting to note that in its justification for the
cancellation, the Navy pointed out that the Brewster plant
was the smallest manufacturer of Corsairs and implied that
the cancellation was therefore less Msignificantn than if
it had affected a more major producer.

They were also quick

to stress the $180,000,000 this cancellation would save the
Navy while assuring the public that defense requirements
would not be impaired.

6

The initial concern over the Brewster contract
termination involved an interesting twist to the labor
question.

The United Auto Workers staged a sit-in at the

plant, not in conflict with management, but in protest over
the Navy decision.

7

In a New York Times editorial, the

question of reconversion was not even raised, instead the
Times argued that labor was being selfish, even unpatriotic,
since there were still plenty of defense jobs which needed
doing even if they all did not pay the $1.06 per hour as
had the Brewster plant•

The editorial went on to point out

that the major effort of the war still lay ahead and even

6

New York Times* 23 May 1944*

7

Ibid.. 30 may 1944 and 31 May 1944*
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suggested that the idea of National Service legislation not
be abandoned simply because the end of the war might soon
8
be forthcoming.
The broader aspects of the contract termination
problem as they applied to business enterprises were not
lost on Senator Murray and the other members of the Senate
Small Business Committee,

Although the Brewster Company

was located in. Long Island* the Committee anticipated the
biggest impact of contract termination would be felt in the
West since it had been that region which had built up most
remarkably in support of the war effort.

9

The Committee*

therefore* decided to hold a series of hearings in the
Western states to assess the problems there first hand and
to let concerned individuals in those states know that their
interests were not being totally ignored in Washington,
8
Ibid.. 31 May 1944. National Service legislation
had been discussed throughout the war and* if passed*
would have allowed the government to conscript workers for
war-related civilian jobs just as was done for military
service.
9

In 1940* California had only 1,000 people engaged
in aircraft manufacturing.
Between 1941 and 1945 this
figure jumped to 300*000.
The Boeing Company of Seattle
employed over 40*000 workers during the war while the Denver
Arms Plant* operated by the Remington Company* and the
Rocky Mountain Arsenal had combined employment figures
in excess of 35*000.
See Gerald D. Nash* The American
West in the Twentieth Century: A Short History of an Urban
Oasis (Englewood Cliffs* New Jersey: Prentice Hall* 1973)*
pp. 206-208.
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These hearings were held during July and August,
1944 in Montana, Washington, Oregon, California, and
Arizona*

In an opening statement to the hearings held

in San Francisco, Senator Murray summarized the problem:
Two months ago the sudden termination of the
Navy Department *s contract with the Brewster Aero
nautic Corporation in Pennsylvania and New York
provided a test-tube example of what will lie
before the country as we approach the end of the
war*
The Brewster case has aroused widespread
interest in the problems of reconversion and post
war readjustment*
It has demonstrated the need
for careful post-war planning if we are to avoid
the development of chaotic conditions.
The Pacific
Coast has been selected for special study and con
sideration because it is recognized that this area
will present a most serious situation when contract
terminations begin * ^
These hearings resulted in no legislative program
to aid western small business.

In fact, plans to hold

similar hearings in the south never materialized.
One of the best guarantees for the future of small
business, Murray believed, was to insure equal representation
for small concerns on government planning boards*

In late

1944> therefore, he introduced a bill which would have
created a Small Business Corporation, an independent agency
with more power and authority than was then possessed by

U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 4 3 .
Developing the West Through Small Business: IV. Field
Hearings* San Francisco* July 21 and August 1. 1944
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944)# P . 5327*
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the Smaller War Plants Corporation.

He proposed to increase

the capitalization of this new agency so that it would be
able to handle effectively any difficulties encountered by
•

smaller concerns during the reconversion period.

11

When

this proposal was interred in the Banking and Currency
Committee* Murray's hopes for an independent small business
agency were indefinitely postponed.

12

The furor created by this seemingly innocuous bill
which only attempted to establish for small business an
agency similar to that already in existence for farmers,
can hardly be imagined and resulted in the first significant
division within t h e .Committee itself*

The opposition to

Murray's bill turned to Senator Wherry for leadership since
he, as the leading Republican on the Committee seemed most
likely to support efforts to decontrol the economy*

A

letter to Senator Wherry from DeWitt Emory, President of
the National Small Business Men's Association, an organi
zation which had been formed as a result of the Depression's
impact upon smaller enterprises, summarized the feeling
of at least Some small businessmen:
11
U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 2 sess*, Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 1 2 .
Part 4* Small Business Act of 194-4 (Washington: Government
Printing Office* 1944)* PP» 2-8s
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Some members of Congress seem to be under the
impression that the greatest ambition of all, or most,
small business men is to have the Government do their
thinking for them, plan the operation of their busi
nesses, loan them unlimited sums of money, re-design
* or develop new products for them, and to place a
field consultant for small business within easy
reach of every small business man in the country,
1 assure you that at least ninety-five percent of
the small business men in the United States want
none of these things, * ♦ . Given a fair break on
taxes, on labor legislation and administration,
on the enforcement of the anti-trust laws, the
small business man can be depended on, not only to
take care of themselves /sic/ but also to provide
employment for more returning service men and women
than all of the big companies in the United States
put together .-*-3
An editorial in the Chic a/go Daily Tribune echoed
these sentiments,

Quoting State Representative Fred A*

Livkers of LaGrange, President of the Conference of
American Small Business Organizations, another newly-formed
small business group, the editorial said that small business
did not want another tax-spending government bureau.

It

indicated that private banks could easily handle financing
and went on to suggest that Murrayfs bill would make success
ful small businesses assume the burden of those businesses
which should normally be doomed to failure because of their
inefficiency or lack of able management.
1-5

Seeing the bill

Dewitt Emory to Kenneth S. Wherry, 7 August 1945,
Papers of Kenneth S, Wherry, Nebraska State Historical
Society*
Hereafter cited as WP,
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as a continuation of the New Deal, the conservative Tribune
insisted that it would mean the end of independent small
business.14
Senator Wherry, in response to the many letters he
received denouncing the Small Business Bill, had second
thoughts about his initial support of the legislation.

In

a letter to a constituent who had written to oppose the
measure, Wherry announced that he had withdrawn his name
from support of Murray!s bill.

15

By dividing the Committee,

he effectively ended the chances for passage of the bill.
When the Small Business Bill failed to receive
Wherry*s continued support and met with disinterest from
members of the Banking and Currency Committee, Murray had
to settle for continuation of the SWPC and the authorization
in Senate Bill 2004 which increased the capitalization of
that Corporation by $200,000,000.

The Senate passed this

proposal in June, 1944 but difficulties encountered in the
the House of Representatives delayed it Until December 11,
when the President approved the measure.
14

16

Chicago Daily Tribune. 13 July 1944, editorial,

WP.
"**^Wherry to Charles Ammons, Cushman Motor Works,
Lincoln, Nebraska, 29 August 1944, WP.
16

Congressional Record. 78 Cong., 2 sess., 90:9097*

The increased capitalization provided for the SWPC
by Senate Bill 2004 had been made necessary by the passage of
several pieces of reconversion legislation which had been
enacted during the summer and fall of 1944*

These laws

had wide-ranging impact on the nation's economy, and each
contained a provision dealing with aid to small business
during the reconversion and post-war period.
The Contract Settlement Act (Public Law 395) was
enacted in August, 1944*

Senator Murray actually coordinated

the bill in the Senate through his membership on the three
committees, including the Small Business Committee, which
considered the legislation.

The philosophy behind the bill

was that the government should quickly terminate unnecessary
contracts so that business interests would ”know where they
stood” in the reconversion period and could plan accordingly.
It provided the SWPC with the authority to furnish interim
and other necessary financing as well as expedited compen
sation for small businesses in connection with their war
contract termination claims. 18
The Surplus Property Act (Public Law 457) was passed
in November, 1944*

This act was even more controversial

17

Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the
Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press,
1956), pp. 199-200.
1 Q

Report 47. Part 1 . pp. 9-10.
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than the Contract Termination Act since just about everyone
had a different idea as to how government stockpiles and
surplus property could best be utilized.

As it affected

small business, however, the Act gave the Smaller War Plants
Corporation the power to finance by loan or guaranty, the
purchase of government-owned plants or surplus property by
smaller concerns.

The SWPC was further authorized to make

purchases itself for later resale to small enterprises.

It

was estimated that there was from $75,000,000,000 to
$102,000,000,000 in government surplus to be disposed of
ranging from shirts, to jeeps, to bomber plants.

The

Committee believed that the right disposal policy could
support an expanding small business economy while the wrong
policy could conceivably ruin the free enterprise system
itself by escalating economic concentrations*

Not only was

there equipment to be disposed of, but it was estimated
that there was $16,500,000,000 worth of government-financed
war plants which would also be placed on the auction block.
Of these plants, 1,163 were estimated to cost between
$25,000 and $249,000 while 1,027 cost between $250,000 and
$1,000,000«

The Surplus Property Disposal Act contained

stipulations against all monopolies or undue concentration.
I

By authorizing the Smaller War Plants Corporation to acquire
and finance small-lot surpluses for small business, the
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interests of small enterprises were thereby enhanced.

There

was also a stipulation in the measure which required the
Attorney General to certify conformity with anti-trust laws
for all plant disposals worth over one million dollars.

In

a variety of ways, therefore, the Surplus Property Disposal
Act was decidedly advantageous to the small concerns of
the n a t i o n . ^
The War Mobilization and Reconversion Act (Public
Law 458) proved to be the most controversial of the three
reconversion measures since it attempted to deal with the
"human side of reconversion."

An omnibus measure dealing

primarily with the predicted problems of unemployment and
readjustment to a civilian economy, the Act contained a
provision which authorized the Smaller War Plants
Corporation to present claims on behalf of small enterprise.
to the newly-established Reconversion Director.

These

claims would supposedly enable small plants to be allocated
a fair percentage of scarce materials.

The SWPC would also

be authorized to regulate the distribution of these resources
to small businesses.20

~^Ibid. « pp. 15-17 •
20
Ibid., pp. 9-10. The fear of unemployment at
the conclusion of the war was uppermost in the minds of
most people. The most popular solution proposed to this
anticipated problem was to encourage free enterprise.
Fortunately, these unemployment fears did not materialize
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Although the Congress had expanded the role of the
Smaller War Plants Corporation dramatically through these
reconversion measures* the Corporation was still due to
expire on July 1* 1945.

Uncertainty surrounding the life of

the Corporation continued almost up until the last moment.
Senator Murray had hoped for support of his bill to make
the SWPC independent of the War Production Board and to give
it an indefinite life span; however* when action was not
forthcoming* he and the other members of the Senate Small
Business Committee compromised on a simple extension of the
Corporation.

Senate Bill 105 was passed April 9* 1945 and

became law on April 30.

21

The lack of permanence which had

dominated the operation of the Smaller War Plants Corporation
and the uncertainty which ensued made it difficult to provide
continuity in the administration of the Corporation and was
a primary cause for poor morale among SWPC personnel.

These

factors* combined with the confusion and doubt they engendered
among small business concerns* were also reasons most members
of the Small Business Committee had thought it so important

and by 1946 most people were confident that their jobs were
secure.
See George H. Gallup* The Gallup Poll. Public
0 pin ion 1935-1971. Vo1. 1 (New York: Random House, 1972)*
pp. 478, 481, 496* and 581,

21

Congressional Record. 79 Cong.* 1 sess.* 91:3186

and 3939*
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that a permanent peacetime Corporation be established.

22

Since a consensus on this issue had been lacking, the SWPC
continued to exist from year to year until 1947 when it
was terminated.

23

Although the majority of the functions

carried out by the SWPC were continued by the Department
of Commerce and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
it was not until 1953 when the Small Business Adminis
tration was finally created that Senator Murray*s goal
was r e a l i z e d . ^

The fact that Senator Wherry took over

as Chairman of the Senate Small Business Committee in
1947 is significant in this regard*

At least equally

important, a boom rather than a depression followed the end
of World War II and small businessmen were too busy return
ing to a lucrative peacetime market to support actively
the creation of another government agency of only dubious
mer it *
The passage of the contract settlement and surplus
property disposal legislation did a great deal to protect
the interests of all businesses in the nation.

Yet the War

Production Board continued to control all allocations of
critical and essential materials and to set priorities on
22

Report 47. Part 1 . p. 11.
t

23

Congressional Record. 80 Cong., 1 sess», 93;4181*

^ Ibid.. 88 Cong., 1 sess., 99 ! 10^47*

manufacturing as well.

This shortage of materials, especially

steel, created many problems for small plants which had had
government contracts cancelled and yet were unable to get
materials so that they could manufacture products for the
civilian market.

In June, 1945* the Committee conducted

a hearing on the impact of reconversion policies on small
enterprises in which several small business spokesmen voiced
their uncertainty and concern for the future.

Caught as

they were between defense cutbacks and the priority system
which denied them adequate materials for civilian production,
the future of many concerns did, in fact, look bleak.

There

was general agreement among small business representatives
at the hearing that special priorities should be established
for smaller concerns to enable them to proceed with civilian
production since f,the big boys could take care of themselves.,f
At this same hearing, J.A. Krug, Chairman of the
War Production Board, defended his use of priorities and
pointed out that with the coming end of war nsmall business
people have the greatest opportunity in their lives.

They

have, X am sure, the greatest chance for, success and
25

U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 6 5 .
Impact of Reconversion Policies on Small Business, June 1 5 .
18. and 19. 1945. Hearings (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1945), PP. 7699-7706.
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prosperity that small business has ever enjoyed."

26

Krug

went on to announce the lifting of restrictions on aluminum
and when fears about small business being able to get its
fair share of this product were raised, he pointed out that
there would be more than enough aluminum for all conceivable
civilian needs.

This had been made possible during the War,

he indicated, when production of this metal had increased
tenfold.

"Here is a tremendous resource built up during

the war, waiting there ready for someone to manufacture
products from it," he concluded.

27

The period between the ending of hostilities with
Germany and the surrender of Japan was a strained one for
the allocation of critical resources.

War production still

had to proceed since the end of the war with Japan was
uncertain, yet a return to a civilian economy was to be at
least partially encouraged*

The WPB issued several priority

regulations during this time, yet the Senate Small Business
Committee criticized each of them as inadequate.

Priorities

Regulation 27 had been designed specifically as an aid to
small businesses and allowed qualifying firms to use the
much sought after AA-4 rating in order to purchase scarce

Ibid.. p. 7716.
Ibid.. pp. 7723-7724.
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commodities for use in civilian manufacturing.

Unfortunately,

certain members of the Committee believed, preferential
treatment had engendered a "fear psychology" among small
businessmen since they took this action to mean that the
government was forecasting difficulties ahead for them.
While the Committee did not call for the discontinuation of
special treatment for small business in the allocation of
priorities, it did suggest that continued vigilance was
necessary if smaller concerns were to survive the transition
4 ^ 28
period.

Xn Priorities Regulation 28, the WPB announced a
further aid to small business.

Small firms would be allowed

to apply for special priorities to assist them in obtaining
bottlenecked items which were holding up their production
of civilian goods.

This preference rating, however, turned

out to apply only to exceptional civilian cases, notably in
the production of washing machines, refrigerators, and
civilian aircraft.

Therefore, the Committee argued that

what had been lauded as an aid to small business was
virtually useless*
28

29

U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 4-7.
Part 3. Impact of Reconversion Policies on Small Business
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 3-5.
29

Ibid.
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On June 30, 1945 the WPB issued Priorities Regula
tion 29 which not only established a new priority rating
structure for military production, but also provided for the
eventual elimination of all civilian priority ratings unless
the WPB felt it was necessary to establish procedures to
"give priorities assistance for war-supporting or highly
essential civilian purposes ,"

The Committee also criticized

this regulation since there was no guarantee that the size
of a firm would be considered in determining what special
assistance should be granted.

30

What the Senate Small Business Committee recommended
was that the WPB amend its regulations so that preferential
ratings would be given to firms doing less than $100,000 in
business per quarter.

This assistance should be granted to

any smaller firms needing one or two commodities to resume
civilian manufacture not just to those "exceptional cases"
referred to in Regulation 28.

The Committee further called

for the strengthening of the War Production Board's use of
its powers of inventory control since the Committee thought
a real danger existed for larger firms to indulge in pre
emptive buying of scarce materials once the war in Europe
had ended*
30

lb id .
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Additionally, the Committee suggested that the WPB,
together with the War Manpower Commission, investigate the
possibility of removing all manpower controls over producers
of basic raw materials even in areas where labor was in
critical supply.

31

It also wanted the WPB to adopt a definite

policy for setting a proportionate share of basic materials,
particularly steel, aside for the exclusive use of smaller
concerns.

This amount should be based on previous use of

such materials by individual small plants, the Committee
32
asserted.
While the provisions contained in the War
Mobilization and Reconversion Act addressed some of these
areas, bottlenecks and delays in receiving shipments continued
to create problems for civilian manufacturers. 33
It seemed to most members of the Committee that the
efforts involved in shifting the ebonomy from war production
31

Although not as stringent as the proposal for
conscripting workers for defense-related jobs, manpower
controls took the form of wage ceilings, anti-strike
provisions, and even the use of military personnel fur
loughed for work in defense production when civilian labor
was unavailable or engaged in illegal work stoppages as had
occurred in the copper mines of Montana during the early
years of the war.
See U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess.,
Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small
Business, Part 11. Smaller Concerns in War Production: I I .
Hearings (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1943)>
pp. 1537-1538.
32
•Report 47. Part 3 . pp. 7-8.

^^New York Times. 19 August 19459 IV, p. 7.
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to peacetime manufacturing required almost as much govern
ment regulation as had been necessary to gear it for war
initially.

Chairman Murray and most of the Senate Small

Business Committee had no real quarrel with this government
supervision of the economy.

What they Wanted to insure was

that this control would result in favorable, or at least
equal, treatment for small concerns.

Senator Wherry,

however, although equally concerned about the well-being of
small businesses, began to believe the answer lay, not in
government regulation, but in the removal of economic controls
over the business sector.

During the same hearing on recon

version policies, Wherry interjected:
The average small businessman is afraid of orders.
He is afraid of directives.
He doesn1t know what the
government is going to do. . . . In the meetings we
held under the able leadership of the Senator from
Montana, time and again small business said: rWe
want government off our backs$ we want the right
to get materials the same as anybody e l s e . * 34
Unlike other differences of opinion, the conflict
within the Committee over the use of priorities did not
create any overt problems.

It merely reflected the broader

feelings within the Congress and the nation as to the best
Ways to deal with the coming post-war situation.
34

Hearings, Part 6 5 . pp. 7717-7718.
This statement
is interesting since several small business representatives
at that same hearing requested more government regulation
of the economy during the reconversion period rather than
less; pp. 7713-7770.
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Certainly, the rapid ending of hostilities with Japan
permitted a smoother transition to a civilian economy*
With the exception of temporary bottlenecks in the distri
bution of commodities to all who wanted them, small businesses
generally found more resources available after the war than
there had been prior to it*

This increase in the production

of raw materials brought about by the war along with the
technical advancements which had resulted, particularly in
the use of the newer metals like aluminum and magnesium,
combined with an almost endless consumer capacity to insure
the prosperity of the post-war period.
returned by the end of 1945 *

Business optimism had

The Hew York Times even went

so far as to report that small business had suffered no
reconversion hardships while a Department of Commerce survey
of 7,000 smaller manufacturers showed ‘that they planned a
$9,200,000,000 self-financed expansion program during the
next year, a move which had surprised government economists
by its optimism* 3 5
The question of price regulation was the second
area of government control with which the Senate Small
Business Committee became involved during reconversion.
In a report published by the Committee in March, 1946

^ Hew York T i mes. 25 October 1945 and 1 August 1945.
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after a series of hearings into pricing problems as they
affected small business, the Senate Small Business Committee
decided that only sufficient production of goods at customary
levels could remove the inflationary dangers present in
the economy.

Until this level of production could be

achieved, the Committee thought that continued price con
trols were necessary.

The report pointed to several reasons

which kept production from reaching this necessary level.
Labor difficulties and shortages, dislocations as industries
shifted from defense work to civilian production, bottle
necks and temporary shortages in materials, and transportation
difficulties, all hindered the full production which they
believed would guarantee freedom from inflation.

The fact

that the OPA was due to expire in June, 1946 while this full
production had not yet been achieved, made most of the
Committee members press for an extension of the life Of that
36
agency.
Although the Committee believed that some form of
price regulation was necessary until full production could
be reached, it had received numerous criticisms about the
actual operation of the Office of Price Administration.
Committee continued to serve as a focal point in Congress
36

Report 47, Part 4 . pp. 1-2* Wherry appeared to
be the Only outspoken critic of the OPA on the Committee.

The
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for small businesses having problems with government
agencies which they were unable to settle directly*

On

December 21, 19459 the Senate passed a budget for the oper
ation of the Committee which recognized this function and
included a substantial fund for special treatment of the
reconversion problems of small business.

The OPA even set

up a special liaison officer to work directly with the
Committee to handle problems encountered by small business
which required Washington action.

37

The Committee believed that the OPA should constantly
review,its policies so that they did not discourage produc
tion as had been done, for example, in the shortening and
vegetable oil pricing policies.

Price increases should be

allowed whenever it was shown that they could stimulate
production.

38

Most members of the Committee considered the
use of cost absorption to be especially important in
controlling inflation*

This policy attempted to

balance cost decreases with cost increases in
determining an industry-wide price.
37
38

By so doing, the

Ibid.* pp. 2-3.

lb id.* pp. 3-5.
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 2 sess.,
Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small
Business, Part 90. OPA Shortening and Vegetable Oil Price
Policy, Hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1946), pp. 10269-10277.

88
policy prohibited price increases when costs had decreased
through the use of large-volume production techniques
simply because the pent-up consumer demands for a product
would support a higher price.

A delicate balance had to

be struck between allowing adequate profit to encourage
production while keeping a ceiling on prices so that the law
of supply and demand did not drive them to totally unaccep
table levels with a concommitant rise in the cost of living
and the push for higher wages which would follow driving
prices even higher.

39

The problem of quality control and the O P A fs attempts
at maximum average pricing (M.A.P.) were also analyzed.

What

the OPA had attempted to do through the use of M.A.P. was
to insure a wide distribution of goods in all price ranges.
Certain producers, especially in the clothing industry,
were required to average out their production of high-cost
goods with an amount of low-cost goods so that an average
price of all goods shipped in any given period would not
exceed the OPA approved price.

This regulation had

created many problems since producers often cut back
production of less profitable goods so that they could
concentrate on those which brought in more money.

The

evil of Mtie-in sales11 whereby manufacturers sometimes
39

Report 47. Part 4 . pp. 5-7.

required retailers to buy cheap goods in order to be able
to purchase more desireable merchandise was also fostered
through the application of M.A.P., especially in the liquor
and clothing industries.
The Committee also addressed the difficulties
involved in the distribution of goods,

it criticized the

OPA for not becoming more involved in this area of the
economy.

Particularly in the distribution of cotton greige

goods, nylon hosiery, lumber, and scarfs (which were being
sold to circumvent regulations pertaining to piece goods),
the Committee deemed it essential that greater coordination
between the OPA and the Civilian Production Agency be
forthcoming.

Each of these problems was unique; however,

they all centered around the manufacturer attempting to
cut the wholesaler out of the distribution picture so that
a greater profit margin would remain at the production level
for the manufacturer to pocket.

The Senate Small Business

Committee did not have specific recommendations to offer
dealing with this problem except to suggest greater “distri
bution controls.M

The Committee concluded its recommendations

concerning the OPA by stating that price controls should
interfere as little as possible with normal business pro
cesses; at no time should they be allowed to force any group

4°Ibid.. pp. 8-13.
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out of business or prevent anyone from entering business
unless it could be shown to be vital to the maintenance of
price control itself*

This line of reasoning was interesting

since it indicated the dedication the Committee had to
the maintenance of price controls*

Even though they

were committed to the protection of established distribu
tion channels and profit margins* most Committee members*
with the notable exception of Wherry, felt that price
regulation was even more important to the overall wellbeing of the economy.

41

Although the OPA was extended for another year*
hostility toward that agency was building.

Just as in

the drive against the Small Business Corporation* Senator
Wherry became the central figure in the battle to end price
controls.

The change in Wherry*s attitude toward price

controls is almost startling.

While he* like Murray and

the other members of the Committee* had had specific and
often important complaints about the actual functioning
of the OPA* Wherry had generally Supported the necessity
for price ceilings during the war years.

In a letter to a

constituent on July 6* 1945> Wherry summed up this attitude:
There are many things about the OPA of which I do
not approve.
However* it was generally felt by the
Senate that some control Of prices was better than no

41Ibid.. pp. 14-16.

91
control and accordingly even in spite of the
OPA criticism* [Xj felt it should be extended
another y e a r . 42
By October* 1945, however* Wherry wrote to Martin
C . Huggett* Executive Secretary for the Chicago Metropolitan
Home Builders1 Association expressing an almost personal
antagonism toward the OPA.

He said in part* "It was my

pleasure to vote against and help defeat L-41 /which
attempted to set price limits on building materials/.

I

hope it is my further good fortune to help throttle Chester
Bowles and his many unfair practices in the OPA."

43

In response to Wherry*s criticisms* Chester Bowles
wrote the Senator a letter on November 25* 1945 in which he
indicated that Wherry had misunderstood the purpose of
establishing dollar and cent ceilings on building materials.
Wherry had suggested that the OPA was ‘attempting to unfairly
control profits and not prices per s e .

Bowles went on to

explain:
If it was our purpose to control profits
we certainly have been grossly inefficient, for
industrial profits have risen 450 percent, 1944
over av. 1936-39.
Department store profits have
risen over 1000 percent*
If my aim was profit
control* I should be taken to the middle of the
Potomac River and sunk in thirty feet of water.

4^Wherry to Meta M. Martin* 6 July 1945* WP.
i

C h e r r y to Martin C. Huggett* 8 October 1945* WP.
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Bowles closed his letter to Wherry by indicating that orderly
decontrol of the economy would best serve the national
interest, including that of small b u s i n e s s . ^
By the early part of 1946, Wherry had decided to
fight the OPA wholeheartedly.

In a letter to another

constituent he wrote!
I might add here that it is my opinion that
we would be better off without OPA unless its
present set-up can be made more flexible. . . .
I feel it is the duty of every American citizen
to do all within their power at this time to
rid us of bureaucratic control.
This letter is even more interesting since it was in
response to a letter to Wherry stating that price controls
should be continued.

45

Wherry, of course, was not alone in his growing
dislike for the OPA.

In January, 1946 an Omaha World-Herald

editorial stated the case against continued price controls.
The paper argued that price controls did not, in fact, pro
tect the consumer, especially in the case of items in great
demand*

By enforcing ceilings on goods, the editorial

contended, scarcity was only increased since very often
companies could not induce men to work at wages they could
afford to pay under their price ceilings.
44

Black market

Chester Bowles to Wherry, 25 November 1945* WP.

^ W h e r r y to K.O. Broady, 15 March 19465 Broady to
Wherry, 12 March 1946, WP.

racketeering was rampant since the situation bred "fly-bynights with their sleezy goods and questionable business
methods."

46

An editorial in the Arizona Daily Star echoed this
theme.

Pointing to the experiences after World War I, the

Star thought temporary inconveniences would be better than
the attempt at "bottle-feeding the American people under
the guise of economic security and stability."

It pleaded

that:
With a world crying for reconstruction, with
millions of homes and their furnishings to be
manufactured, with millions of automobiles to be
sold and increasing millions of mouths to be fed,
let us have enough faith in the principle of free
initiative to bring an early end to these blighting
controls.
Let us not be frightened by bogeyman tales
of the 1919-1920 period.
Let us have faith that
what made this country great will continue to make
it great, and that Americans are not weaklings,
unwilling to take risks and hardships that go with
the functioning of the free market of a free
society.
Let us end the controls.47
The New York Times took a slightly more moderate
view.

While it advocated continuation of the OPA for the

time being, it did call for liberalization of controls,
especially if it would encourage production*

The Times

46
Omaha World-Heraid« editorial. "The Crumbling
Dike," 17 January 1946, reprinted in Congressional Record.
79 Cong., 2 sess., 92:A153.
47

Arizona Daily Star, editorial, "Let Us End the
Controls," 28 February 1946, reprinted in Congressional
Record. 79 Cong., 2 sess., 92:A12l6.
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editorial saw price controls as only a short-term measure
which only indirectly regulated inflation.

As such, price

controls should be ended "as promptly and as smoothly as
conditions make possible,” the paper concluded.
Congress did extend the OPA in a greatly weakened
form during the summer of 1946, but when it failed to
stabilize the economy President Truman dispairingly
terminated the agency on November 6.

49

immediately after ceilings were removed.

Prices rose
Food prices six

months after the end of price controls were fifty percent
higher than they had been the previous year while manu
factured products were up thirty-five percent.

Some

business analysts believed these figures indicated that the
economy would soon suffer an even greater fall than had
previously been predicted, but it was not until several years
later that their warnings would prove at least partially
t r u e .^
While the Senate Small Business Committee, with
the exception of Wherry, continued to press for government
48

New York Times, editorial, "Congress and Price
Controls," 8 April 1946, reprinted in Congressional Record *
79 Cong.5 2 sess., 92:A2020*
49

Congressional Record. 80 Cong., 1 sess., 93*A1040.

^^C.F. Hughes, "Merchants Point of View," New York
Times, 2 March 1947> reprinted in Congressional Record.
80 Cong., 1 sess., 93:2043.
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regulation of the economy with special emphasis on prefer
ential treatment for small business, it was becoming
increasingly apparent that J.A. Krug had been right, that
unlimited potential, even without government assistance,
existed for small firms.

Popular publications began run

ning "how to" articles for starting various small business
ventures with emphasis on the returning veteran.

Cl

Ideas

for publicizing surplus property sales to encourage veterans
to buy materials so that they could go into business for
themselves were also advanced.

52

Since the economic outlook, if not positively rosy,
was at least much brighter than anyone had predicted, the
Committee began to focus on ways to insure that small
business received its fair share of any post-war bonanza.
Although the Committee never succumbed to a totally pollyana
spirit, always fearing the threat of monopolies and greater

.R. Jenkins, "Before Starting Your Own Business:
Advice to Returning Servicemen," Readerfs Digest« May, 1945,
46:89-925 J.D. Woolf, "If I Were Starting a Small Business,"
Reader 1s Digest. July, 1945, 47:98-100; M* Maverick,
"Opportunities for Veterans: What Small Business Offers and
How Returned Servicemen Can Get Into It," New York Times
Magazine. 30 September 1945, P» 12+; these are only examples
of a favorite topic in the publications of the reconversion
period *
52
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 9 8 .
Effect of Current Surplus Property Disposal Policies on
Veterans in Small Business: III. Hearings (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 10995*
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economic concentration, it was not completely immune to
the growing feeling that prosperity was near.
In hearings conducted in April, May, and June, 1945*
the Committee studied the question of how to insure small
business a place in the expanding world market.

Maury

Maverick, Chairman of the Smaller War Plants Corporation,
even prepared a bill to enable the SWPC to enter into
contracts with foreign governments on behalf of small
enterprises.

The Committee proposed a bill similar to

Maverick*s on May 13, 1946, yet like so many of the C o m m i t t e e ^
later proposals, it died in the standing committee to which
54
it had been referred.
?

This effort to insure small business its fair share

of any advantages resulting from the coming of peace was
also evident in a series of hearings conducted during
February, March, and April, 1945.

Containing over one

thousand pages of testimony, these hearings attempted to
assess the future of light metals and to see what could
be done to insure that small business could benefit from
the tremendous advances which had been made in that industry
53

U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 6 2 .
World Markets for Small Business: I I . Hearings (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1945)» p. 7335.
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during the war.

Seeing the future production of the

nation coming to depend on aluminum and magnesium as much
as it always had on steel, the Committee was concerned that
the disposal of government-owned plants and stockpiles be
done equitably.

11The Way in which we dispose of them, «

said the Committee,’’will fix the opportunities for the
economical,development and use of light metals in this
'
55
country for many years to come.”
The Committee stressed the fact that in the pro
duction of aluminum and magnesium, two-thirds of the labor
took place in the fabrication processes.

Additionally,

all but a few of the fabricators of these metals were
classified as small businesses just as were most of the
retailers of these products.

Since the Federal government

had become the biggest producer of aluminum and had backed
production of most other light metals to the extent that a
pre-war production of 300,000,000 pounds of aluminum had
increased to 2,000,000,000 pounds, a valuable resource had
been developed.56
55

U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 4.7.
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Printing Office, 1945)9 P* 6008.
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Representatives of large companies also testified
at these hearings and it was apparent that the Committee
intended no witch-hunt until the question of the Shipshaw
Contract arose.

This contract involved concessions to the

Aluminum Company of Canada, a subsidiary of Alcoa, the
undisputed giant in the aluminum field, by the Office of
Production Management during the war.

A complex issue,

fraught with pros and cons, it had also been the subject of
an investigation by the Truman Committee Investigating the
National Defense Program.

Senator Truman had stated that

"we are principally interested in getting aluminum; I would
be willing to buy aluminum from anybody.

I don*t care

whether it is the Aluminum Company of America or whether
it is Reynolds or A1 Capone.”

57

This reminder that the

exigencies of the wartime situation demanded action which
was not always beneficial to everyone defused the potential
scandal•
Although the Committee continued to be very active
with its hearings and investigations, it was otherwise
almost silent concerning the problems of small business as
the war came to an end.
57

Legislation was proposed as in the

U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 5 9 .
The Shipshaw Contract: III. Hearings (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1945)» p* 7101.
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cases of aid to small businesses in foreign markets and to
provide for a peacetime Small Business Corporation* but when
these measures received little interest in Congress
and relative indifference* if not hostility, from small
businessmen themselves, they were allowed to die.

In

fact* so unsympathetic were some small businessmen to later
Committee hearings that criticism was even raised that
witnesses had been purposely selected who represented
Committee views as opposed to the attitudes of most small
businessmen•^
The reason that small business had become so dis
interested in government aid was a valid o n e .

With recon

version, they had become so busy returning to a fully
civilian operation (and making money in the process) that
they had very little to gain from government assistance

Excerpt in Wherry's file from undesignated letter
from Indianapolis, Indiana dated 22 May 1944, WP. Wherry's
staff had made a typed copy of the original letter which
Was not filed and the name of the writer was not included
on this copy. Wherry seemed to consider it an important
criticism, however, as he had the excerpt typed and filed
with his papers on the Senate Small Business Committee.
While the veracity of such criticism cannot be assessed
with the resources available* it should be noted that
several times during the Committee hearings, a point was
made that business spokesmen or letters from businessmen
in support of Committee proposals were unsolicited.
See
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee to Study
Problems of American Small Business, Part 65. Impact of
Reconversion Policies on Small Business. Hearings
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), P« 7693*
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and actually stood to lose in some cases by further government
regulation of the economy* even in the guise of assistance
to them.

Unlike farmers who did not compete directly with

each other for a piece of the market, small businessmen
had more to fear from government aid to their competitors
than they had to gain from that very assistance for them
selves once prosperity was assured.
Business Week Commented on the background of this
prosperity when it pointed out that the previous five years,
rather than working against small business, had actually
strengthened it.

The article pointed to the advantages

small business had enjoyed during the war through tax
breaks and the "ravenous civilian market" which large con
cerns had left almost exclusively to smaller businesses
when they turned to war production.

It also mentioned the

protection Congress had provided for small concerns which
had caused the OPA and other government agencies to deal
with them more gently than they did with their large compe
titors*

Although the article mentioned small business fears

that by 1947 they might be losing ground competitively when
compared to big business* it indicated that small business
was in a much stronger position than it had ever been in
before the war.59

~*9Business W e e k . 31 May 1947j P« 15.
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Xn one of the few statements concerning small business
before the Senate in the early post-war period, Senator
Murray took a much more pessimistic view.

Citing statistics

prepared by the Smaller War Plants Corporation, he showed
that big business had grown tremendously during the war.
These figures indicated that this increase had been most
pronounced among those very large firms - those employing
10,0()0 or more workers.

These giant corporations increased

their share of total manufacturing employment from thirteen
percent in 1930 to thirty percent in 1944.

Murray also

pointed to the increase in the number Of mergers, particu
larly in the fields of iron and machinery, drugs and pharma
ceuticals, liquors, foods, and textiles.

He saw this trend

toward concentration as frightening and called for a strong
resumption of anti-trust prosecutions b y the Department of
Justice in order to prevent collectivism and maintain economic
freedom.^
Murray's belief that business concentration was to
be feared and that the American way of life was at stake if
small business was weakened had begun to lose its appeal
by the end of the war.

Small businessmen were still sus

picious of economic concentration, but a growing fear and
y
—"T—
i

60

,

...T . _

Congressional Record. 79 Cong., 2 seas,, 92:6886-6887*
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resentment toward government bureaucracy was beginning to
assert itself even more strongly in the minds of some.
The views of Senator Wherry brought this change into focus.
While a further study of the economic situation at the end
of World War IT would undoubtably clarify this issue, the
fact that a greater number of people in the country were
now dependent upon larger concerns for their security and
livelihood perhaps meant that their power to inspire emnity
had been reduced.

Even smaller enterprises had become

dependent upon the larger businesses in many ways, both
as customers and suppliers.
The shift in thinking that this represented was
tied neatly to the return of Republican pre-eminence in
the Senate in 1946.

When Wherry replaced Murray as Chair

man of the Small Business Committee, a subtle change took
place in the working of that group.

While economic concen

tration was still investigated when specific situations
warranted, as during the petroleum shortage of 1946-1947,
the Committee seemed to become less interested in direct
government intervention to rescue small concerns.

Govern

ment aid had become suspect, and many small business spokes
men, now that prosperity was virtually assured, tended to
oppose federal intervention in the economy.

Small business

representatives created little newspaper or magazine

103
publicity following the war*

While additional research

beyond the scope of this thesis would be necessary to sub
stantiate this conclusion, it is probable that most small
businessmen were too busy enjoying the benefits of post
war prosperity to be overly concerned about the threat of
monopolies and viewed government "red-tape1' as more of a
hinderanee than a help.

CHAPTER IV

STATUS OF SMALL BUSINESS AFTER WORLD WAR II - A BALANCE
SHEET ON THE SENATE SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE

In attempting to assess the position of American
small business following World War II, it is first necessary
to define small business.

The difficulty in forming such

a definition readily becomes apparent.

Does one use employ

ment figures, sales or production figures, or perhaps even
percentage of total market calculations?
The confusion which has resulted from a multitude
of definitions makes a statistical analysis of small
business and its position before, during, and immediately
following World War II virtually meaningless.

Government

figures are inconsistent while business figures are unavail
able.

The measurement of the actual impact of various

government actions upon small business is, therefore,
subjective, based primarily upon claims made by the Senate
Small Business Committee as to its success in dealing with
this problem*
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These claims are suspect, too, for the Committee
employed matiy possible definitions for small business at
various times during its investigations.

It even went so

far as to consider Reynolds Aluminum "small" in comparison
to the giant Alcoa even though its characteristics were
very different from those of most small concerns.

I

The Committee was really interested in an expanded
definition to include as many businesses as possible.
Therefore, in the proposed Small Business Act of 1944,
small business was considered to be:
Any enterprise for profit which, if engaged
primarily in production or manufacturing, shall
have employed 500 persons or less forthe
calendar
year next proceeding. . . or
If primarily a wholesale establishment, whose
net sales shall aggregate not more than a million
dollars for such calendar yeart or
If primarily in retail, amusement, service,
or construction establishment, whose net sales
or receipts for such calendar year shall
aggregate not more than $250,000.
Provided that /the business/ shall not include
any business concern which /is/ a dominating unit
in its trade or industry or otherwise under the
management or control of such a dominating unit.
1

U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 4 8 .
Future of Light Metals. Hearings (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1945), pp. 6133-6134•
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In making such determination . ♦ . the comparative
size of establishments in the particular trade or
industry /shall be considered/.^
Under this definition, all but 0.12 percent of the
business concerns in the country would have been categorized
as 11small •"

The Senate Small Business Committee would have

allowed all but the 3,600 companies who were indisputably
giants to be considered small by this classification.
Of course, numerically, small business was vastly
superior to big business.

Even by limiting the definition

of small business to include those firms employing less
than 250 workers, half the number of the Committee definition,
ninety-five percent of all enterprises within the nation
would be considered "Small.H

However, when the percentages

of employees are considered it is significant that this
ninety-five percent of the nation's businesses employed less
than fifty percent of all non-agricultural Workers.

Although

there might have been more small businesses than large ones,
their influence on the economy was steadily declining.
In its hearings and in the legislative proposals
which resulted, the Senate Small Business Committee attempted
2
U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 1 2 .
Part 4. Small Business Act of 1Q44 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1944)> p. 2.
3
A.D.H. Kaplan, Small Business. It« Place and
Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), pp. 21-22.

107
to lump all of these enterprises into one category to
which similar remedies could be applied.

The basic impossi

bility of this attempt finally became apparent to the Committee
as they considered the conflict of interest between, for
example, the small tire dealer and the small rubber manu
facturer or the small grocery store owner and the small
livestock producer*

4

Although the Committee continued to encourage the
idea that small business was a cohesive special interest
group like farmers or labor, the reality of the Situation
soon forced them to deal in specifics rather than generali
ties.

This has been discussed previously, especially in

the hearings on price controls, rationing, and reconversion
needs.

With the exception of the Federal Reports Act, very

little proposed by the Committee could be considered of
benefit to the entire small business community.

Even the

establishment of the Smaller War Plants Corporation pertained
almost exclusively to small manufacturers and did little if
anything to benefit small distributors or retailers who
actually composed the bulk of the small business population
and who suffered the most as a result of war (See Appendix I ) .
4
U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 479.
Part 2, Recommendations on Effective Participation and
Protection of American Small Business in the War. . . and
After (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 19-23•

How effective, then, was the Senate Small Business
Committee in helping independent small business survive the
war?

While the answer to this question is obviously highly

subjective, it should first be made clear that small busi
ness did actually emerge from the war with a higher absolute
prosperity than ever before although its percentage of the
total product had declined.

5

During the early war years, from 1941 to 1943, onesixth of all businesses closed with smaller concerns bearing
the greatest burden.

This rise in the number of business

deaths had numerous causes, among them the draft and the
lure of high paying defense jobs.

The Senate Small Business

Committee had been quick to point out that while the govern
ment was spending vast sums of money to expand the produc
tive capacity of the nation, large numbers of unused plants
were being forced to shut their doors due to lack of manpower, materials, defense contracts, or credit*

6

New business starts were also down for the period
1941-1943 for most of the same reasons that so many firms
had closed their doors*

‘i

~

New business entries for the first

'

Kaplan, Small Business * p* 51*

6
U«3* Senate, 79 Cong*, 1 sess*, Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 4 7 .
Part 1. Senate Small Business Committee - Its Record and
Outlook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), PP* 3
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three months of 1943 dropped to an all-time low.

Manu

facturers were the exception to this downward trend•

New

plants were built to fulfill war contracts to the extent
that the number of manufacturing firms showed a net increase
of nearly 15,000 between 1939 and 1943.

7

Those small businesses which continued throughout
the war suffered setbacks in comparison to large firms.
Increased concentration became evident as early as 1943 when
the same small firms which had employed 42.5 percent of the
8
total business work force employed only 31.5 percent by 1943.
Big business had definitely gotten bigger during the war.
After a bleak two years, business recovery became
apparent by the end of 1943.

By the spring of 1944 new

businesses were being started twice as fast as businesses
were discontinuing.

A year after t h e ‘end of the war, the

business population had increased even more markedly and
more than counteracted the decline which had taken place
during 1941-‘1943 .

(See Appendix I) .

The prosperity which war production had brought
about was primarily responsible for this upturn, yet certain
contributions had been made through the Work of the Senate
Small Business Committee.

Even though big business had

7
Kaplan, Small Business, p. 45.
8

Ibid., p. 46.
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/

j

r

/

dominated in the receiving of defense contracts, the efforts
of the Committee and its brainchild, the Smaller War Plants
Corporation, had placed over $12,000,000,000 in contracts
with small business.

Not only did this provide additional

funds to smaller concerns, but more significantly, it
allowed them to go into many new areas of endeavor, particularly in the light metals and plastics fields.

Q

While the future for small manufacturers looked
good at w a r 1s end, the possibilities for small concerns in
the construction industry and in retailing were excellent.
Service industries also had an exceptionally good prospect,
especially since very little in the way of capital investment
was required to begin.

Additionally, the advancements made

by business in the South and West during the war had been
10
substantial.
Even the benefits which had accrued to large
businesses as a result of the war could be beneficial to
smaller concerns since the high level of employment and
prosperity they helped to create expanded the potential
markets for small business as well.

By turning to customized,

9
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 4-7.
Part 1. Senate Small Business Committee - Its Record and
Outlook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), PP* 9-10.
10

Ibid., pp. 17-20.
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individualized production of everything from apparel to
i

home furnishings, the small concerns could only benefit
from the increased standard of living even if they were
unable to compete directly with their larger counterparts.
Additionally, the new products which big business produced,
front radios to lawnmowers, created the need for new service
facilities and small enterpreneurs readily filled the gap.
Once it becomes clear that small business was not
significantly hurt, and in many ways even helped by the
war and post-war economy, the question of the Senate Small
Business Committee’s influence can again be approached.
Senator Murray and most other members of the Committee had
an acute fear of giant corporations, almost to the point
that they were unable to grant that they served any useful
purpose.

Although this fear of big business had apparently

diminished by w a r ’s end, by attempting to sanctify small
enterprise, the Committee did serve as a brake upon the War
Production Board and the military procurement agencies in
their attempt to turn the war over entirely to the large
concerns.

11

Through its hearings on the rationing orders of
the CPA, the Committee also allowed smaller concerns to
11
In Report 47, Part 1, the Committee even commented
that small business and big business could co-exist in
harmony, p. 4*
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receive some protection from government pronouncements
which, no matter how necessary they might have seemed,
still had the power to ruin thousands of independent
retailers virtually overnight.

By opening its hearings

to representatives of many small concerns and through its
field hearings conducted in various parts of the country,
the Committee allowed specific problems to be presented.
Then by calling forward the director of whatever government
agency was concerned, the Committee was sometimes able to
strike a compromise satisfactory to both parties.

Of course,

the very fact that government administrators might have to
justify their decisions before the Committee must have at
least made them consider more carefully the consequences
their actions might have upon the small businesses of the
nation.

These benefits are intangible, but while they

cannot be measured or accurately assessed, they were none
theless significant to the continued existence and well
being of small business.
Another intangible benefit which resulted from the
existence of the Committee was the sense of identity it
served to give to stnall businessmen.

Prior to the formation

V*'

of the Senate Small Business Committee in 1940, hearings by
the TNEC had first mentioned small business as a separate
entity.

This somewhat novel approach to the problems of the
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economy was immediately fastened upon by Senator Murray in
his move to establish the special Senate Committee to bolster
small business support for the Roosevelt Administration.

12

While there had been very little feeling of kinship
between the small manufacturer and the small retailer or
between the owner of the corner gas station and the owner
of the papermill on the edge of town, in fact they had much
in common.

Problems of financing, taxation, and even of

filling out government forms and applications were all
similar as were difficulties they encountered in ordering
scarce commodities and in dealing with price ceilings and
rationing edicts brought on by the war economy.

Previously,

small businessmen had felt that they had more in common
with members of their church, lodge, or even with represen
tatives of large concerns within their own industry than
they had with other small businessmen.

In fact, prior to

the formation of the Senate Small Business Committee,
small businessmen’s associations were almost non-existent.
12

It is interesting to note in this regard
"small business" was not even a separate topic in
R e a d e r ’s Guide to Periodic Literature until after
formation of the Senate Small Business Committee,
it has remained a separate listing since then.
13

13

that
the
the
yet

The Small Business M e n ’s Association was founded
in 1937, just prior to the TNEC investigation; the National
Federation of Independent Business, the largest of the
small business organizations, was founded in 1943; and the
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By attempting to create a constituency, the Senate
Small Business Committee helped focus the idea of simi
larity of interests among at least some small businessmen.^
Furthermore, by attempting to treat them as a class, like
labor or farmers, the Committee almost inadvertantly pointed
out the complex interlocking characteristics of the economy.
They thereby forced government planners to revise many of
their more simplistic attempts at regulating the economy
and served as a counterbalance to the demands of the other
interest groups.
Although the Committee was influential in the re
conversion period through its efforts to insure that small
businesses received their fair share of government surpluses
and allocations of scarce commodities, its prestige, while
never high, was on the w a n e .

The split between Wherry and

Murray was at least partly responsible for this decline

Conference of American Small Business Organizations was
founded in 1942.
See Encyclopedia of Associations. Edition
9 (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1975).
The rise in
small business awareness growing out of the Depression and
war years merits further study.
' "I A

Retail stores formed cooperatives to buy govern
ment surpluses, for example*
See New York Times* 20
September 1944; and Governor Thomas E. Dewey even attempted
to rally this new interest group during the 1944 election.
See New York Times. 1 November 1944.
,
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since it can hardly be expected that a special committee
which did not present a united front would wield much
influence.

An even more cogent reason for the inability

.

of the Committee to inspire much interest was simply that
small businesses, once the wartime emergency was over, were
doing so well that they felt they had no need for a protector
in Washington.

When the situation had looked grim during

the early war years, they had welcomed the intervention of
the Committee in their behalf and in some cases even demanded
it.

By 1946, small concerns seemed almost universally con

vinced that they could go it alone.

However, the new aware

ness that the Senate Small Business Committee had helped to
ic
inspire lingered on.
It was additionally encouraged
through the Office of Small Business in the Department of
Commerce which had been formed to carry on some of the
functions of the Smaller War Plants Corporation.

Thus

in 1953i when a downturn in the economy occurred, it was
hot surprising that the small business community once
again became active and sought government assistance in
their behalf, culminating in the creation of the Small
Business Administration.
15

Business Week, 31 May 1947.. p# 15 discusses this
change in small business thinking during the immediate
postwar period.

16

The creation of the Small Business Administration
was tied to several circumstances, among them the
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Small businessmen would never be as homogeneous a
group as farmers or labor, but they would continue to see
themselves as members of a new, distinct group.

The counter

balance that this new status provided politically, likewise
cannot be measured, yet it did exist.

Politicians had to

consider proposed legislation for its effects on yet another
interest group, and although small businessmen continued
to advocate independence, they learned the value of cooper
ation in establishing organizations to aid themselves not
only in conducting their businesses, but in lobbying
activities in Washington.
The Senate Small Business Committee did not act
alone in dealing with the small business question.

In

addition to a House of Representatives Small Business
Committee, both the Truman Committee to Investigate the
National Defense Program and the Select House Committee
Investigating National Defense Migration (Known as the
Tolan Committee) were active in attempting to aid small
businesses.

A look into the activities of these committees

discontinuation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
This topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, but illustrates
the fact that small business awareness did not completely
die during the period of prosperity following the war.
See
Deane Carson, ed., The Vital Majority. Small Business in
the American Economy (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1973)9 pp. 9-12.
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would surely cast additional light upon the status of
small business during World War II.
The resumption of anti-trust prosecutions after the
war helped to insure that unlawful concentrations would
not be encouraged at the expense of smaller competitors.
In the case of United States vs. New York Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Company (A & P), the U.S. Court of Appeals
decided that even though the chain store was efficient and
could sell its products for less than smaller businesses,
its restraint upon the competition placed it in violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

The Court had decided that

the lower prices charged the consumer by A & P did not
Justify the harm which could result to the community if
independent grocers were forced to close their doors.
The danger of the growth of chain stores was
that they tended, as in the A & P case, to become their
own producers and distributors as well as retailers.

If

they were also the supplier to their competition, as in
the A & P case, and on less favorable terms than to their
own outlets, the small competitor could easily be denied
the opportunity to compete freely on the merit of his own
product and service.

While the Court specifically stated

that bigness was no crime as long as it did not destroy

fair competition, the decision helped to insure that larger
concerns could not blacklist smaller ones or give preferential treatment to their own subsidiaries.

17

Although the resumption of anti-trust investigations
allayed some of Senator Murray’s worst fears, no attempts
at trust-busting were staged at the end of the war.

Big

business had become a way of life in the United States and
it continued to employ even greater numbers of workers and
exert its influence upon the nation in countless ways (See
Appendix I X ) .

Before the Depression, the existence of big

business was also pervasive within the economy; the differ
ence was that then it had been considered the exception;
everything that was not "big business11 was simply "business.”
Somehow, either during the Depression or as the nation
geared up for war production, a subtle shift in thinking
occurred.

Suddenly big business became not so much the

exception as the norm and "small business" came into
existence.

From 1940 onward, there were "business" and

"small business" differentiations.

Smaller concerns, while

still numerically superior, were now the distinct minority
in numbers of individuals employed, and their proportionate
share of the market had also declined.
17

Governmental emphasis

U.S. vs. New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company. 6 7 F . Supp. 626 (1946) and 173F. 2d 79 (1949).
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had shifted from attempts to curtail the growth of major
concerns to efforts to aid smaller enterprises through
educational, financial, and various other subsidies so that
they could continue to co-exist with the giant corporations
of the nation.

The Senate Small Business Committee, through

its hearings and investigations, illustrated this change.
This change in thinking about big business versus small
f
•■

business was never spelled out by the Committee, yet it
indicated the way in which the country had grown as a
result of the wartime economy.
Many changes had taken place in American society
by the end of the Second World War.

No longer would issues

be as easily classified as either black or white.

Murray*s

old-fashioned liberalism was as out of place in the post
war environment as Wherry*s conservatism.

Murray had failed

to adequately adapt to changes in thinking which fore
shadowed the "military-industrial complex" mentality of
the 1950’s and 1960’s, while Wherry1s conservative fear of
big government provided no viable alternative in the sophis
ticated technological society which was emerging.

Both

men looked nostalgically to the less complicated past when
it had seemed quite possible for an ambitious individual
with courage and hard work to become an "Horatio Alger."
They both tried, in different ways, to keep this opportunity

120
alive.

Yet, post-Depression and post-war Americans had

become more interested in security and comfort; most saw
the possibility of becoming independently wealthy as a
mere dream.
Small businessmerf and the larger corporations were
concerned with a rational, ordered economy so that all
could share in the ffgood life.*1

Previous attempts at
5:
^

providing order had proved only partially successful,
perhaps because there had been no simple solutions to the
complexities of an America in the twentieth century.

The

Senate Small Business Committee did nothing to clarify the
problem.

Xt had not even been able to give a truly con

vincing argument for the continued existence of small
business despite the gut-feelings they shared that somehow
it was important and good.

Just as the agrarian ideal had

been pervasive throughout earlier periods of American
history, the small business man symbolized the America of
the early twentieth century.

But Just as farmers had been

relegated to a secondary position by increased industriali
zation, so the small business man became less dominant in
the emerging corporate state♦
As the formation of a Senate Small Business Committee
reflected, small business had been put on the defensive.
The hearings and investigations conducted by the Committee
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only reinforced this contention.

Big business did not need

to justify its place in defense production as small business
did; big business could virtually take care of itself during
reconversion, but smaller concerns needed help of all kinds.
That small business did survive the war and even prospered
in the post-war environment cannot obscure the fact that
the economy had made a momentous shift toward concentration,
and most importantly, this concentration had become an
accepted way of life to most Americans.

Large concerns

could provide more job security and greater fringe benefits
than could most small businesses.

The government might

continue to encourage small concerns, but it would not be
allowed to do so at the expense of their larger competitors.
Small business might indeed be sacred as Senator Murray
often insisted, but big business was profitable, and
therefore, more valuable than any marginal small concern
could ever be, no matter how holy.
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APPENDIX II
1919
NUMBER OF FIRMS BY EMPLOYEE TOTALS IN MANUFACTURING
Total
# of estab.
# of workers

*

1-5

21-50

290,105

141,742

56,208

25,379

9,096,372

311,576

631,290

829,301

101-250
# of estab.

6-20

251-500

10,068

500-1000

3,599

1

51-100
12,405
888,344

Over 1000

1,749

1,021

# o f whiskers 1,581,768
1,250,875 1,205,627
2,397,596
1
Abstract of the Fourteenth Census of the U.S.,
Department of Commerce (Washington: Government Printing
Office), 1923, pp. 986-987.

1949
t

NUMBER OF FIRMS BY EMPLOYEE TOTALS IN MANUFACTURING
Total
# of estab.
# of workers

# of workers

50-99

240,881

117,005

80,662

18,672

14,294,304

471,887

1,805,842

1,300,719

100-499
# of estab.

10-49

1-9

qOQ-QQO

Over 1000

19,878

2,729

1,935

4 ,160,981

1,883,464

4,671,411

2
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
of the United States: 1949, seventieth edition (Washington:
Government Printing Office), 1949, p. 929#
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